INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

2018

Public sitting
held on Friday, 14 September 2018, at 3 p.m.,
at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg,
President Jin-Hyun Paik presiding

THE M/V “NORSTAR” CASE

(Panama v. Italy)

Verbatim Record
Present: President Jin-Hyun Paik

Judges Tafsir Malick Ndiaye
José Luís Jesus
Jean-Pierre Cot
Anthony Amos Lucky
Stanislaw Pawlak
Shunji Yanai
James L. Kateka
Albert J. Hoffmann
Zhiguo Gao
Boualem Bouguetaia
Elsa Kelly
Markiyan Kulyk
Alonso Gómez-Robledo
Tomas Heidar
Óscar Cabello Sarubbi
Neeru Chadha
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree
Roman Kolodkin
Liesbeth Lijnzaad

Judges ad hoc Tullio Treves
Gudmundur Eiriksson

Registrar Philippe Gautier
Panama is represented by:

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as Agent;

and

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Mr Hartmut von Brevern, Attorney at Law, Hamburg, Germany,

as Counsel;

Ms Mareike Klein, LL.M., Independent Legal Consultant, Cologne, Germany,
Dr Miriam Cohen, Assistant Professor of International Law, Université de Montréal, Member of the Quebec Bar, Montreal, Canada,

as Advocates;

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Mr Jarle Erling Morch, Intermarine, Norway,
Mr Arve Einar Morch, Manager, Intermarine, Norway,

as Advisers.

Italy is represented by:

Mr Giacomo Aiello, State Attorney, Italy,

as Co-Agent;

and

Dr Attila Tanzi, Professor of International Law, University of Bologna, Italy, Associate Member - 3VB Chambers, London, United Kingdom,

as Lead Counsel and Advocate;

Dr Ida Caracciolo, Professor of International Law, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Caserta/Naples, Member of the Rome Bar, Italy,
Dr Francesca Graziani, Associate Professor of International Law, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Caserta/Naples, Italy,
Mr Paolo Busco, Member of the Rome Bar, European Registered Lawyer with the Bar of England and Wales, 20 Essex Street Chambers, London, United Kingdom,

as Counsel and Advocates;
Dr Gian Maria Farnelli, University of Bologna, Italy,
Dr Ryan Manton, Associate, Three Crowns LLP, London, United Kingdom,
Member of the New Zealand Bar,

as Counsel;

Mr Niccolò Lanzoni, University of Bologna, Italy,
Ms Angelica Pizzini, Roma Tre University, Italy,

as Legal Assistants.
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Today we will hear the second round of oral pleadings by Panama in the hearing of the Tribunal on the merits of the M/V “Norstar” Case.

First, I give the floor to the Agent of Panama, Mr Carreyó.

MR CARREYÓ: Thank you, Mr President. Being 27 minutes past the hour, I will start my presentation today. Good morning to all of you, distinguished delegates of Italy.

The justification for universally recognized provisions of maritime law stems from the 17th century when free trade via sailing vessels arose. This need has ultimately led to this Tribunal, which is charged with interpreting the actions of member States for their common good.

In this case, this Tribunal has not been called upon to reinterpret Italian law, but rather to judge whether or not, when applying its domestic statutes, Italy has acted in conformity with its obligations under the International Convention on the Law of the Sea as regards the “Norstar”.

During the past four days in these oral hearings we have discussed a large number of legal and factual issues. Now, Panama would like to take the opportunity to take a look once again at what we believe are the most salient features of this case.

Panama has asked the Tribunal to examine the Decree of Seizure of 11 August 1998 and related legal documents, as well as Italy’s conduct in this case directly involving their international responsibilities for any violations of the international law of the sea.

The argument that Panama has been advancing is that the arrest of the “Norstar” and the subsequent events that led to its ultimate demise strongly indicate a breach of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Convention has established a legal regime which is based on maritime zones. In this instance, the reasoning of Panama has been unambiguous and straightforward. All the evidence that has been presented has shown that the “Norstar” was operating on the high seas and that Italy’s actions have interfered with its right to do so.

During this second round of oral proceedings Panama will refer to several of the arguments that Italy has brought forward in its first round, such as the alleged enlargement of the dispute, the breaches of article 87, the locus of the activities for which the “Norstar” was arrested, the location of the arrest in Spain and why this does not affect the basis for Italy having arrested this vessel. We will again refer to the concept of corpus delicti. We will also approach the alleged release of the “Norstar” to which Italy referred, and we will insist on Italy’s breaching its duty to act in good faith. This will be covered by me. I will then pass the floor to the advocate Miriam Cohen who will first provide a summary of the arguments of Panama in light of some of the evidence heard in this proceedings.

She will then address Italy’s statements regarding Panama’s alleged confusion between national and international law and, finally, will argue that Panama has fully
met its burden of proof. Advocate Mareike Klein will continue to explain why
article 87 applies in this case and that there is indeed a violation of the freedom of
navigation of Panama. She will particularly discuss the contents of the Decree of
Seizure and will contest Italy’s arguments in this respect, for approximately half an
hour, and for the same length of time advocate Olrik von der Wense will respectively
cover the question of reparation by way of compensation and some comments about
article 300.

At this point in the proceedings, Panama notes that Italy has not brought a single
new argument to be considered but has evidenced the same contradictions as
before.

Because the “Norstar” was not arrested on the high seas but in Spanish internal
waters, Italy believes that article 87 does not protect Panama.

If the Convention is interpreted in a narrow sense, the conclusion could be that the
right to freedom of navigation on the high seas may only and exclusively be
exercised on the high seas – or, in certain cases, according to article 58, in the
exclusive economic zone – and that therefore an infringement of article 87 is only
possible there.

An argument often used for this interpretation is that the right of access to and from
the sea was not guaranteed by article 87 but by article 125 of the Convention.

However, this provision grants the right of access only to land-locked States but not
to coastal States. This again could lead to the conclusion that article 87 of the
Convention did not protect vessels outside the high seas – and in certain cases the
exclusive economic zone – except for vessels of land-locked States. Following this
narrow interpretation, the “Norstar” also would not have been in the geographical
scope of protection of article 87 at the time of the arrest, and for this reason there
was no breach of article 87.

However, Panama would like to argue very clearly against such a narrow
interpretation of the Convention.

We all know that the freedom of the high seas is one of the oldest principles of
international law of the sea, and a fundamental concept of the Convention. Panama
is convinced that the interpretation of the Convention should take into account the
will of the contracting States to assert the principles of this Convention as effectively
and as fully as possible.

Article 87 of the Convention reads: “The high seas are open to all States, whether
coastal or land-locked.”

This wording refers not only to immediate but also indirect interference with the
freedom of the high seas. This strongly suggests that even if these interferences do
not occur directly on the high seas but take effect from a different location, they still
impact navigational freedom.
We are convinced that article 87 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea should be interpreted broadly. Article 87 must also effectively protect against interferences in the freedom of the high seas with the conscious aim of preventing that exercise, such as by way of seizure of a vessel or by imposing restrictions on its legal activities.

This is exactly what happened in the present case. Italy purposefully attempted to prevent Panama from exercising its freedom of the high seas, sanctioned and prevented legal bunkering activities by initiating criminal proceedings as well as by arresting the “Norstar”.

Italy has shown that it carried out the arrest in Palma de Mallorca Bay with full knowledge and intent, and deliberatively interfered with the right of a ship to exercise its freedom to navigate on the high seas.

Panama has not argued that Italy is unable to arrest a vessel in port in the course of its internal proceedings. However, what the evidence has shown is that the arrest was for acts occurring on the high seas and not within Italian territory.

In the M/V “Louisa” Case, Judge Cot’s Dissenting Opinion at paragraph 24, page 98, reads:

If the offence was committed in a location where the relevant Spanish legislation – in this case, the provisions of the Criminal Code ... particularly in its internal waters and territorial sea – is applicable, the Spanish judicial authorities may exercise criminal jurisdiction without infringing upon international law.

Read contrario sensu, this comment coincides with Panama’s theory concerning the present case in the sense that, if the offence was not committed in a location governed by the Italian Criminal Code, particularly not within its internal waters or territorial sea, the Italian judicial authorities may not exercise criminal jurisdiction without infringing international law.

As we will show later, what matters is where the transactions for which the vessel was confiscated occurred and were conducted.

The “Norstar” may have purchased bunkers on the Italian coast and then conveyed them to the high seas where they were sold to mega yachts.

However, the fact that the goods were bought in the coastal State does not constitute illegal conduct. You still have to link it to something else, and that something else was the reintroduction by mega yachts into Italy.

Has Italy provided evidence about how many of all those mega yachts supplied with bunkers on the high seas went back to Italy in order to affirm that there was a suspicion of a crime of smuggling and tax evasion having been committed?

Or is Italy simply assuming that the “Norstar” and the persons connected therewith were accomplices of such mega yachts who reintroduced the bunker back into Italy?
At page 15 of its first round, lines 9-13, Italy stated:

In fact, had the fuel been consumed by the “Norstar” and the leisure boats in question on the high seas and/or carried to ports located in the internal waters other than those of Italy or of other EU coastal States, such as Gibraltar, the resale of the fuel in question on the high seas would not have raised the slightest suspicion concerning offences of the kind in question.

Italy also stated that the sale of fuel on the high seas, did not constitute a suspected offence as such, but it was materially instrumental in grounding the suspicion that the fuel declaration – which was filed at the time of purchase on Italian territory – was false, and that the re-entry into Italian ports could amount to tax evasion. Here, again, the suspected offences would occur exclusively on Italian territory.

As we can confirm, Mr President and distinguished Judges of this Tribunal, Italy has had to admit that the sale of fuel on the high seas was “materially instrumental in grounding the suspicion.”

Therefore, there is no doubt that the bunkering operations had been considered as part of the criminal acts that led to the arrest of the “Norstar”.

Italy then said that “the Decree did not target bunkering activities, which means activities carried out on the high seas”. However, it is clear that without such bunkering activities Italy could not possibly say that there was a suspicion of any crime of smuggling or tax evasion because, as we have already demonstrated, a foreign element is intrinsic in the commission of such crimes. We will turn now to the alleged enlargement of the dispute.

Within the context of Italy’s defence about an alleged enlargement of the dispute, Panama would like to recall that, in its first round of oral arguments, Italy has continued to differentiate between the Decree of Seizure and the request for its execution, on the one hand, and the execution or enforcement of that Decree, on the other, constantly using the phrase “the Decree of Seizure and the request for its execution”, followed by a similar number of citations of those two conducts in the afternoon session.

In our first round we referred to the Rejoinder, stating that Italy had argued that only those damages derived from the Decree of Seizure and from the Request for Execution as such could be claimed, but not from the actual enforcement of the order of arrest. In its first round, Italy again referred to the same issue, quoting paragraph 122 of the Judgment of 4 November 2016.

With this argument, Italy is once again trying to deny its responsibility for the enforcement of the arrest by tacitly shifting all responsibility to Spain, even though Italy itself had requested the enforcement of the “Norstar”’s arrest.

Italy has ignored that in its Judgment of 4 November 2016 this Tribunal stated:
In the view of the Tribunal, ... the Decree of Seizure and the request for its enforcement by Italy were central to the eventual arrest of the vessel. It is clear that without the Decree of Seizure, there would have been no arrest;

and that in the preceding paragraph the Tribunal had not considered relevant the reference made by Italy to the distinction between a State’s conduct that completes a wrongful act and the State’s conduct that precedes such conduct and does not qualify as a wrongful act, stated in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case;

but rather stated that

The present case, which involves the action of more than one State, fits into a situation of aid or assistance of a State in the alleged commission of an internationally wrongful act by another State.

Of particular importance is that this Tribunal also found at paragraph 167 that

The Tribunal notes that the detention carried out by Spain was part of the criminal investigation and proceedings conducted by Italy against the M/V “Norstar”. It is Italy that adopted legal positions and pursued legal interests with respect to the detention of the M/V “Norstar” through the investigation and proceedings. Spain merely provided assistance in accordance with its obligations under the 1959 Strasbourg Convention. It is also Italy that has held legal control over the M/V “Norstar” during its detention. This is clearly evidenced by the communication that took place between Italy and Spain subsequent to the seizure of the M/V “Norstar”, including Italy’s letter of request dated 18 March 2003 for the release of the vessel and its return to the owner following the judgment of the Court of Savona and Spain’s letter dated 6 September 2006 asking for Italy’s authorization to demolish the vessel. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the dispute before it concerns the rights and obligations of Italy and that its decision would affect the legal interests of Italy.

Italy has stated that Panama has been relying on this Tribunal’s Judgment despite the fact that such decision was adopted in the Preliminary Objections phase of this case and that since we were in the merits phase we were not bound to respect those findings. Panama disagrees. Panama completely understands what this phase of the case on the merits means. However, we do not accept that the previous findings are of no importance. On the contrary, Panama considers those findings very valuable to understanding the subject matter of this dispute.

Would this Tribunal have accepted the present case if it believed that the enforcement of the arrest, as Italy stated, did not fall squarely within the framework of article 87?

Are we to believe that Italy is still trying to place its responsibility on Spain?

Let us stress again that this Tribunal stated, “[w]ithout the Decree of Seizure and the request of its enforcement, there would have been no arrest.”
It is not valid to raise a distinction whether the damages were caused by the Decree of Seizure, the request for its execution or by its actual enforcement.

Let us also be perfectly clear that Italy is responsible for all three phases of the arrest and thus for all damages caused by them to Panama.

Italy, as usual, is trying to play with the language more than address the substance of the issue. Specifically, Italy is trying to greatly circumscribe article 87 and claim that it does not apply to the Degree of Seizure which is all that it is responsible for. Let us briefly review the Italian breaches of this provision.

Italy has stated that Panama has not presented evidence that the “Norstar” was navigating in the summer of 1998. However, the witness Morch lucidly declared, under oath, that in July 1998 the “Norstar” was in Algeria.

Panama has recently received a copy of the declaration given by the former captain of the “Norstar” at the moment of the arrest, Mr Tor Tollefsen, who, on 22 February, made a declaration before the chief prosecutor in Alicante, Spain, corroborating what Mr Morch had just said in his declaration. This document is in Spanish and Panama will send a translated copy to the Tribunal, who, after seeking the views of Italy, may make a decision as to its admissibility.

Coming back to the main issue about article 87 applicability - that is, the location of the activities for which Italy arrested the “Norstar” - Italy insists that although it arrested the “Norstar” because it was bunkering on the high seas as part of the investigation concerning the commission of the crimes of smuggling and tax evasion in Italy, this conduct does not amount to a breach of article 87.

Italy has also insisted on characterizing the “Norstar”’s conduct as smuggling and tax evasion:

In the verbatim record of Wednesday 12 September, afternoon session, page 5, Italy regretfully insisted on characterizing the “Norstar”’s conduct as follows:

As described in the Decree of Seizure and in the request for its execution, the gasoil was bought exempt from taxes (as ship’s stores) from warehouses in Livorno, Italy and in other EU Member States. The gasoil was smuggled in Italy and it was sold in Italy by evading customs duties.

We do not have any doubt that this Tribunal will have something to say about the way Italy, in spite of the fact that there were no crimes at all, is still using the same arguments that refer to the “Norstar” and the persons connected therewith as criminals. We have been respectfully warning Italy about this procedural conduct all along the written and during these oral proceedings.

Nothing forbade the “Norstar” from buying the bunkers in any coastal State and taking them within its own tanks to the high seas to sell them there or anywhere on the globe. Italy has not presented a single piece of evidence about any of the mega yachts that were supplied with bunkers on the high seas being fined or prosecuted because they returned to Italy.
We would like Italy to answer these and other questions tomorrow.

If some of those mega yachts did return, what control did the “Norstar” have on such a decision? Could Italy have demanded that the “Norstar” had some sort of registry over such mega yachts?

Page 5 of the 12 September verbatim record, afternoon session, shows that Italy used an analogy with trucks to assume illegal conduct when this has not been the case. This example reinforces Panama’s thesis because it concludes that the illegality was committed in the country where the fuel was “illegally sold” and the sale of the bunker was on the high seas.

Although on page 3 of 12 September’s verbatim record, afternoon session lines 36-39 Italy states that article 87 is not concerned with territoriality or extraterritoriality, but rather only with interference with navigation. We all know that if a State applies its jurisdiction (prescriptive or enforcement) it can do it territorially (in its own territorial waters) or extraterritorially (on the high seas or in the territorial waters of another State). The latter is precisely what Italy did. It applied its custom law and its enforcement jurisdiction to acts carried out on the high seas by the “Norstar” and all the persons connected therewith.

The other main issue in this case concerns the location of the arrest.

The Italian argument that article 87 is not applicable to vessels in port is not tenable.

When Italy appointed an expert in Italian law, Panama expected that all our questions concerning this case would be resolved. It was disappointing to see how unfamilar Mr Esposito was with the law of the sea, but what is more important is that neither is he familiar with the records of this case.

These proceedings have left many unanswered questions from Italy. Panama would have liked to have the opportunity to pose them in a formal way to Italy before this stage of the proceedings or during the first round with the object of obtaining answers. However, we understand that the rules of procedure do not provide for such a valuable procedural instrument.

Since Panama could not ask the Italian legal expert those questions either, for the reasons just explained, we will pose some of them now to Italy in the expectation that tomorrow we will have answers.

First question: did the fact that the “Norstar” moved from the high seas to the territorial waters of a foreign state change the rationale for arresting this vessel in the first place? Panama contends that the fact that the “Norstar” moved from the high seas where it operated did not change the underlying reasons for which the arrest order had been issued in the first place. Those reasons have been stated in the Decree of Seizure itself.

Second question: is it not legally necessary in Italian criminal law to confirm the existence of a criminal offence before issuing a Decree of Seizure against a foreign vessel?
The Italian legal expert yesterday said that, since it was a probatory seizure, for a prosecutor to arrest a foreign ship, the existence of a crime did not have to be proven. So our first question to Italy will be: in Italy, for a foreign vessel to be arrested, even for probatory purposes, is it not necessary to have proven the existence of a criminal offence?

Although for Panama this is very strange proceeding, because in Panama, in order to arrest a person or a chattel, even for probatory purposes, the arresting party within criminal proceedings has to prove first the existence of a criminal offence. I honestly believe this is a universal rule.

What was the crime that had objectively been proven that supported the arrest of the "Norstar"?

The consequence is that, according to the Italian legal expert and Italian criminal law, you first arrest a foreign ship, and after the arrest, you then investigate if a crime has been committed. Panama believes that it should be the other way round.

Third question: if, as Italy has accepted, in this case the arrest order was issued because of the alleged offences of smuggling and tax evasion, and that it would have been unlawful to arrest the "Norstar" on the high seas, what difference does it make to arrest on the high seas or in Spain if the offences for which the arrest was issued were the same?

By the same token, would Italy consider an arrest of a foreign vessel unlawful on the high seas, but lawful on the territory of a third State, for the very same offence?

Fourth question: if, as Italy has admitted, the arrest of the "Norstar" on the high seas would have been a breach of article 87, and the arrest order was based precisely on the fact that it had to be "performed in the international seas and hence beyond the territorial sea and the contiguous zone", as we will see the Decree of Seizure said, would it still consider such an order lawful, and why?

Fifth question: can an arrest order of a foreign vessel be legally based on the fact that it has to be performed beyond its international seas and its contiguous zone, and later decide to execute it within the territory of a third State?

Was there any sense of urgency to arrest the "Norstar", particularly considering that the arrest order was issued after it had been freely bunkering for several years in the same location?

Although Italy insists that paragraph 2 of article 87 only concerns Panama, it would be necessary to remind Italy that the fact that Italy does not exercise the right to freedom of navigation does not mean that Italy, as a coastal state, does not conduct itself with due regard to the interests of Panama in its exercise of such right, which is precisely what article 87, paragraph 2, is designed for.

Let us turn to the examination of Panama’s appointed witnesses.
In its first round of oral arguments in Thursday morning’s session, Italy stated that the case of the “Spiro F” had nothing to do with the present case. The Italian Co-Agent even interrupted our examination of a witness relying on the same argument.

However, as can be confirmed, Panama introduced a reference to this case firstly in the Memorial as Annex 6, with a transcript of the deposition of Silvio Rossi addressed to and received by the prosecutor of Savona on 18 September 1998, before the arrest of the “Norstar” had been enforced.

On page 2 of this piece of evidence Mr Rossi cited article 255 of the Italian Customs Book as follows: “For what concerns the use of the foreign and exported national ship supplies, the Italian and foreign ships that are sailing in the territorial waters are considered outside the Customs territory.”

He also declared that on page 4 he referred to the Istanbul Convention that in its C annex says: “The fuels and the propellants inside normal pleasure vessel tanks are admitted duty free at the importation without being subjected to any prohibition and restriction.”

He also stated on page 7 that the gas oil inside the tanks, present on board of the vessel at the moment of its entering the State territorial waters that may have been boarded in any communitarian or extracommunitarian place, or moored in ports or staying in high sea ... as at the moment of entering of the vessel the territorial waters said supplies have been considered by the Italian Customs law in foreign state ... as extracommunitarian goods.

On page 8 he added that in view of all the above reasoning, it is to conclude that the activity of all the pleasure vessels that have been refuelled in extra-territorial [international] waters is absolutely right and it cannot absolutely be considered as a contraband activity.

Finally, on the following page he concluded that for years and years the pleasure vessels have entered the Italian ports having inside their tanks gas oil on-boarded in foreign ports (activity still continuing) without the need of releasing any declaration to the Customs purposes and without suffering any penalty.

I have decided to bring this to you, Mr President and honourable Judges, to confirm the knowledge, experience and consistency of the opinions given by this witness in his oral deposition when he referred to the bunker supplied by the “Norstar” as a “naval provision”, confirming that the legal tax regime that governed the bunkering in Italy was circumscribed to four articles: articles 252, 253, 254 and 255 of the Customs book.
He again explained on page 13 of the verbatim record, in a very detailed fashion, that in order to co-operate with the police, he “used to give the position of the boat” and that this was “22-23 miles off the coast, far away from the border of the national waters.”

When we asked him about the “real reasons” the Public Prosecutor had for arresting the “Norstar”, he said on page 15 that “he did not know if it was done for ignorance of for bad faith”, but that they “confuse national product, national fuel, with foreign fuel. They confuse consumption with supply.”

When he was asked about the application of the Italian Criminal Code he stated on page 16 that “when you have a ship in the middle of international waters, for sure this is not national fuel – it is foreign fuel.” When the witness asked if he could use his memory, the Co-Agent of Italy abruptly interrupted the declaration.

We did not learn what the document was about because the witness had been interrupted by the Co-Agent of Italy and we reminded the President about the agreement we had reached with him about not interrupting the declarations. In spite of that, the Co-Agent of Italy interrupted once again later on. Fortunately, this time the President called him to order.

The President then asked Panama if it knew whether the document had already been introduced before the closure of the written proceedings, but we could not answer because we had not been allowed to ask the witness what this document was about. The document in question was disallowed, but we could find out afterwards that the document was the same as Annex 6 of the Memorial to which we have just referred.

The witness was then again abruptly interrupted by the Co-Agent of Italy when the witness referred to the “Spiro F”. We were then asked to confine our questions to this case but this evidence had been part of the previous pleadings, as you can confirm.

On page 19 of the verbatim record, this witness confirmed that the evidence of the case in Savona would not have changed at all if the “Norstar” had not been arrested.

When asked about how he felt about the fact that Italy had filed some documents stating that he had masterminded a criminal plan, this witness confirmed on page 15 that he felt concerned, and that this was a situation “not so nice to be in” and on page 18 that he had “suffered three years of investigation”. He also confirmed he had to pay $40,000 to lawyers to defend his case in the Italian proceedings.

This witness answered all questions in such a way that showed his competence, and he even explained why he was so experienced in Italian customs laws and even French law.

With reference to the witness Morch, Italy only tried to discredit his declaration by asking whether he had prepared it himself, failing to show a conflict of interest on his part as part of the Panama delegation.
Yet in its oral statements, Italy has insisted on proclaiming that the suspected crime consisted of three elements: first, loading the tanker with fuel in Livorno; second, to subsequently reselling this fuel to Italian and other European leisure boats stationed on the high seas, off the coasts of San Remo; and third, allowing these leisure boats to return to Italy.

Even though, Mr President, we kindly asked Italy to refrain from referring to the activities of the persons involved in the operation of the “Norstar” as crimes, Italy has insisted on revictimizing and aggravating their suffering publicly when it refers to instances of false declarations.

Turning to the question of corpus delicti, on page 17 of the morning session of Wednesday 12th, Italy gave a definition from its Criminal Code stating that it is “an instrument to be used in the further investigation of suspected smuggling and tax evasion.”

As you may recall, Mr President, Panama had already asked the question until when Italy was going to continue calling the “Norstar” corpus delicti if we already knew that the suspicions that smuggling and tax evasion had been committed did not exist any more after the final decision of the Genoa Tribunal in 2005.

However, Italy has insisted on tacitly characterizing the conduct of the persons involved in the operation of the “Norstar” as criminals. This, again, Mr President, should not be allowed in these proceedings any more.

We heard from the Italian legal expert that in order to execute an arrest it was not necessary to have evidence of a crime because it was a probative seizure.

However, as Advocate Klein will show, although the Decree of Seizure stated that the “Norstar” had “an intrinsic probationary nature”, in its considerations the Public Prosecutor stated that the “Norstar” as corpus delicti was part of the “objects through which the investigated crime was committed”.

In other words, it was not, as the Italian legal expert stated, that the arrest was only for probatory purposes.

Italy has been acting as if it had been an enforcement of its release order. Panama contends that in the same manner in which the prosecutor had sent a Request to Spain by means of an international letter rogatory, Italy should have sent another letter rogatory to Spain to request the enforcement of the judgment of the tribunal of Savona, and not a simple note dated 18 March 2003, and that this could have only been made once the Savona judgment had been final after the confirmation by the tribunal of Genoa in 2005.

Italy has portrayed the idea that, because the appeal did not refer to the “Norstar”, this vessel was no longer detained. It is worth remembering that one of the communications to the owner was to threaten him on 21 March 2003 with auctioning the “Norstar” if he did not retrieve it within 30 days.
However, we know that this is not the case, because once an appeal is filed, the outcome of the judgment that is the object of such appeal has to be suspended until the appeal is decided.

This is contrary to what Italy has been stating over and over, i.e., that since the arrest order of the “Norstar” was not mentioned on the appeal, the release order became final.

However, the contrary has been confirmed by the Genoa Court of Appeal, when on 31 October 2006 this high court of Italy stated, making reference to the Savona Tribunal judgement that

Having noted that this judgment obviously has to be enforced and there is no decision to be taken given that the destiny of the vessel, after having been given back to the party entitled, does not fall within the competence of this Court (and in any case, given that the first instance judgment was confirmed, any issue on the enforcement of the said judgment would be the competence of the Court of Savona pursuant of Article 665 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). (Annex 14 to the Memorial).

Panama still does not understand how Italy may refer to the retrieval of the “Norstar” as an unfulfilled obligation of Panama or the shipowner, as it has been stating all through these proceedings.

Panama contends that all references to the alleged communications from Italy to the shipowner concerning the release of the “Norstar” either in 1999 or 2003 fall down with this clear and unambiguous declaration made by the Appeal Tribunal of Genoa in 2006.

After this date, Mr President, Italy did not make any single effort to communicate with Panama or the shipowner concerning the enforcement of the release order. On the contrary, Italy evaded all communications that Panama tried to make with them, when they had a duty to act in good faith.

On page 14, lines 32-35, of the verbatim record of 12 September, afternoon session, Italy considers that its conduct prior to the commencement of these proceedings, and during these proceedings is a matter not related to the question as to whether Italy has fulfilled in good faith the duty to respect Panama’s freedom of navigation under article 87 of the Convention.

If Panama claims that article 87 has been breached by Italy, it is only logical that from the very moment that this occurred on September 1998, due to the 11 August 1998 issuance of the Decree of Seizure, all of Italy’s conduct should be according to the standard of good faith.

If Italy, having breached article 87, also behaved in such a manner that also shows that it has not acted in good faith, it is more than obvious that a breach of article 300 is duly linked to another provision of the Convention and is not used as a standalone norm.
Panama takes issue with Italy’s reference to article 283 because, contrary to what Italy proposes, there were no negotiations at all. Italy has not presented any evidence to support its assertion that Panama made any settlement proposals. What Panama did was to demonstrate its willingness to obtain at least an answer to any of its communications, not even to its contents but to the fact that Italy had been receiving them. This is simply called “acknowledgment of receipt”.

But Italy was incapable of even doing that. It preferred to keep silent. It was not until several attempts, and particularly one made through diplomatic channels, that Panama decided that it could not wait any more for such acknowledgement.

The Italian excuse of the lack of an authorization to represent Panama as its Agent was characterized by Italy as “a legal mistake” and an “error on the law” for which it considers that it has been sanctioned by the Tribunal with the rejection of Italy’s arguments in this regard.

Panama disagrees. The Tribunal has not imposed any sanction on Italy. The rejection of its Preliminary Objections was as a consequence of its lack of substance, and because of the procedural aspects that were thoroughly debated at such stage of this case. They do not have anything to do with the duty to act in good faith.

Although Panama considers this duty as a substantive standard, it does not mean that it may also be claimed in respect of the procedural stages of the case. Panama contends that Italy has not been conducting itself in such a manner as to say that it has complied with its duty to act in good faith, as has been expressly explained in the first round of oral proceedings and in all of its pleadings.

On the question of silence, for instance, Italy’s failure to respond to all the communications sent by Panama is considered by Italy as a form of opposition. Panama disagrees. Panama responds that if Italy had at least acknowledged receipt of any of the communications sent by Panama then the Italian argument that silence was some sort of opposition could have been valid. But not in the absence of any of the communications, because this did not give Panama any certitude about the fact that Italy had received those letters. Let us remind ourselves that it was not until Panama instituted proceedings that Italy for the first time acknowledged their receipt.

This has been the Italian pattern of conduct, for instance, also when Panama has asked for its collaboration with reference to its criminal proceedings. Let us remember that Italy opposed the request for evidence concerning such files. Italy stated that Panama was under the procedural obligation to particularize any of the documents that it needed before Italy could consider disclosing them.

Panama disagrees with this answer, because it has been Italy who has had access to and control of all evidence concerning this case. This is a very important issue. Panama has had to rely on the documents that its goodwill has allowed to be presented.

However, this conduct has not been supported even by the expert on Italian criminal proceedings, who candidly accepted that all the files in a criminal case are allowed to
be used as evidence in the proceedings of another case jurisdiction. Therefore there was no valid reason to accept excuses for not allowing Panama to have access to all the files in such criminal proceedings. A lot of questions would be answered with that information.

This expert also agreed with Panama that Italy should have presented as evidence the letter sent by the Diplomatic Litigation and Treaties Services of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented as evidence in Annex 12 of the Reply, where the name of the Agent of Panama had been mentioned, and where this office of the Italian Government stated that

This Service, which the General Secretariat has requested deal with the matter, has been involved since last September corroborating the effective legal situation in which the matter in question took place. For understandable reasons, information and details have been obtained from the Tribunal in Hamburg, in a confidential manner.

If this letter was received by the Public Prosecutor on 18 February 2002, and such office had been dealing with the matter since last September (2001), Panama considers that it should have been disclosed by Italy during some stage of the present proceedings.

Furthermore, when Italy offered a list of documents to allow Panama the possibility to choose among those on the list the ones that Panama would like to be given access to, Italy again omitted this document. This conduct demonstrates a clear lack of compliance with a duty to act in good faith.

The same applies to the letter from the same Diplomatic Litigation and Treaties Services of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented as evidence by means of Annex 7 to the Memorial, where, although concerning the “Spiro F”, the head of such office advised or warned the Public Prosecutor of Savona of the fact that Italy did not have a contiguous zone and that he took the opportunity to remember you the importance to comply with the international rules, being the case a very delicate question which involves from one side the custom interests of Italy but on the other side the respect of the Maltese flag interests, and if there is any small mistake your action won’[t] get any advantage.

Italy stated that “there is a difference between detention, that is, enforcement action, and acts that are the logical precedents to the enforcement action”.

All the Italian reasoning points to the alleged fact that “damage would stem from the enforcement of the Decree, not from the Decree and the Request for Execution.” With this statement Italy demonstrates two aspects: Italy only wants to discuss the legality of the order itself, not the arrest, but on the other hand it admits that damage stemmed from the arrest enforcement of the Decree and not from its adoption and Request for Execution.

Panama’s contention is that, while damages may have only been a final consequence of the arrest enforcement, the unlawfulness of the issuance or adoption and of its request for its execution were central to its execution and
its judicial authorities never said that the Decree of Seizure was in any way unlawful because of its extraterritorial application or for any other reason. It is therefore a logical fallacy to say, as Panama does, that, because those involved with the “Norstar” were acquitted, then article 87 of UNCLOS was breached and that Italy cannot venire contra factum proprium.

But let us see what the Italian tribunals have said about the lawfulness of the prosecutor decree.

Five years after the Decree of Seizure, the Court of Savona held that

(5) The purchase of fuel intended to be stored on board by leisure boats outside the territorial sea line and for its subsequent introduction into the territorial sea shall not be subject to the payment of import duties as long as the fuel is not consumed within the customs territory or unloaded on the mainland1

and that

Whoever organizes the supply of fuel offshore –it does not really matter whether this occurs close to, or far from, the territorial waters line –does not commit any offence even though he/she is aware that the diesel fuel is used by leisure boaters sailing for the Italian coasts…Nor is there an offence…when diesel fuel, either sold or transshipped offshore, has been purchased on the Italian territory with a relief from the payment of excise duties because the fuel was regarded as a store. These goods are then considered to be foreign goods once the ship leaves the port or at least the territorial waters line.

This Italian first instance tribunal referred to the “elements of the conduct” as “the purchase of oil products in non EU countries or in Italy and in other EU ports but under a customs-free regime, for such products to be then used to refuel ships or vessels outside Italian territorial waters.”2

The Savona Tribunal then confirmed that the purchase “outside the territorial sea line” for its subsequent introduction into Italy, “no matter whether this was close to, or far from, the territorial waters line”, and whether it had been “purchased on the Italian territory”, was not a crime.3

Contrary to what Italy is now trying to assert, this Italian judicial authority clearly recognized that:

(6) In light of the above remarks, before asserting any kind of criminal liability, a preliminary test is needed as to where the provision of supplies occurred because if it took place outside the line of territorial waters no one of the offences charged does actually exist.4

1 Rejoinder, Annex F.
2 Tribunal of Savona Judgment, p. 6; Memorial, Annex 10, and Counter-Memorial, Annex M.
4 Ibid., para. 6, p. 10.
Consequently, the Tribunal of Savona ruled that the arrest of the “Norstar” was wrongful precisely due to the location of the vessel when it was bunkering. For this reason, the Public Prosecutor’s order of arrest was revoked and the vessel was ordered to be returned to its owner.

On 18 August 2003 the Public Prosecutor filed an appeal against this decision, basically repeating all of its legal and factual arguments, the same arguments that Italy has been using before this Tribunal in the present case. For instance the Public Prosecutor stated: “We are not contesting whether the vessels seized could carry out bunkering operations, but we are contesting that the activity carried out was quite different from actually being bunkering”.

Those words used in these proceedings by Italy are the same.

Another quotation from the Public Prosecutor:

giving wilfully and consciously to the product they sold a destination different from the one for which they had obtained the tax exemption (with reference to the product bought in Italy, mainly by “NORSTAR, that was therefore reintroduced artificially into the customs’ territory).

Let us now revisit what the High Tribunal of Genoa decided:

The Genoa Tribunal unequivocally decided: “the appeal is unfounded.”

The Genoa Tribunal also determined that

A recreational vessel may load abroad fuel constituting ship’s stores, both in case of foreign goods and Italian exported goods, and is relieved from paying duties upon returning in the waters of Italian ports, unless it is unloaded or consumed inside the customs borderline.

Italy has continuously proposed that article 87 is not applicable and therefore has not been breached because the vessel and the persons connected therewith had carried out their conducts within Italy.

However, in addition to the Savona Tribunal, the Genoa Higher Tribunal also declared:

That the purchase by recreational vessels of fuel intended to be used as ship’s stores outside the limit of territorial sea and its subsequent introduction inside it does not entail any application of duties so long as the fuel is not consumed within the customs line or landed; that no offence is committed by anyone who provides bunkering...

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5 Appeal submitted by the Public Prosecutor against the Court of Savona Judgment, p. 2, Memorial, Annex 13, p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Preliminary Objections, Annex K.
8 Ibid., p. 9.
This is the “Norstar” on the high seas, even in full knowledge that the gasoil will be used by leisure boaters bound for Italian coast; that there is not any possibility of establishing the offence provided for, and punishable under ... when the gasoil, which has been sold or transshipped on the high seas, has been purchased under exemption from payment of the excise duty for being ship’s stores (such goods are certainly to be considered foreign goods once the vessel has left the port, or once it has gone beyond the limit of territorial waters).  

The Genoa court concluded that: “The consumption of fuel in Italian territorial waters does not amount to smuggling.”

Clearly, this Italian final and definitive judgment confirms that anyone who provides “bunkering on the high seas”, as Panama has repeatedly characterized the activity of the “Norstar”, and for which, in turn, it has been roundly criticized by Italy, has not committed any punishable offence.

In other words, the Court of Appeal judgment strongly supports Panama’s case in this dispute, while refuting Italy’s. This would certainly explain why Italy has chosen not to rely on this piece of evidence at all, and Panama hopes that in its second round Italy can also explain this.

Due to the time restraints, Mr President, I would like now to call advocate Miriam Cohen, who will cover the issues of Italy’s statements regarding Panama’s alleged confusion between national and international law, and how Panama has fully met its burden of proof. Thank you, Mr President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Carreyó. Since we started half an hour late, for which I apologize, the sitting will continue until 5 p.m., when we will take a break.

Now, I give the floor to Ms Cohen to make a statement.

MS COHEN: Thank you, Mr Carreyó.

Distinguished President, Members of the Tribunal, it is an honour to appear again before you to submit arguments on behalf of the Republic of Panama in the second round of oral proceedings in the M/V “Norstar” Case.

My task before you today is to make submissions on three points. I will first overview the main arguments of Panama, in light of the evidence presented in the hearings, and the principal issues that still divide the Parties.

Secondly, I will briefly address Italy’s argument regarding remedies under domestic law and its claim that Panama confuses “Italian domestic national and international
law”\(^1\), an argument which is ultimately based on Italy’s misconstruction of Panama’s claims;

Finally, I will demonstrate that Panama has met its onus of proof and, through written and oral evidence, has sufficiently proved its case;

I will proceed to highlight the main arguments of Panama in relation to the issues that still divide the Parties and review some of the evidence presented in the oral hearings:

During its first round of pleadings, Italy has devoted a great deal of attention attempting to blur the issues in the present case, especially as it concerns articles 87 and 300 of the Convention. Opposing Counsel stated that this is a “simple and narrow”\(^2\) case. Panama submits that rather than simple and narrow, the case before the Court is rather clear, despite Italy’s efforts to paint another picture. Italy, by its own actions, violated articles 87 and 300 of the Convention, incurring international responsibility for which it must provide reparations to Panama in the form of compensation. Panama also adds that this is a very important case, one that establishes: the scope of article 87 – freedom of navigation – a freedom upon which the law of the sea is founded; the concept of good faith and abuse of rights, enshrined in article 300 of the Convention; and the limits of a State’s jurisdiction not to interfere with the freedom of the high seas.

Panama’s arguments on the law, in a nutshell, are, and have always been, as follows. First, Italy, through its Public Prosecutor, issued a Decree of Seizure that was contrary to Italy’s obligations under international law, namely article 87. The reason is clear: the Decree of Seizure related to activities performed on the high seas, that is, bunkering activities of the “Norstar” in international waters. The Decree of Seizure explicitly, expressly, says so. To rebut any further argument from Italy in this regard, my colleague Ms Klein will address this very point: the text of the Decree of Seizure leaves no room for confusion that the activities that were the object of the Decree occurred on the high seas. Panama has presented ample evidence that the bunkering activities the “Norstar” was performing took place on the high seas, as Panama’s Agent has just stated. Italy itself admitted so\(^3\). Italy has also accepted – and how could it not – that bunkering on the high seas is a completely lawful activity\(^4\).

What Italy now tries to claim is that the Decree of Seizure pertained to activities within Italian territory. If Panama has established that the “Norstar” carried out – lawful – activities on the high seas, it is unsurprising that Italy’s only hope is to misconstrue, misinterpret, essentially change the words of the Decree of Seizure to claim that it aimed at activities carried out in Italian territory. But Italy cannot change history, and it can certainly not modify the clear facts of this case.

Italy paints a distorted picture of the factual matrix of this case in the hope of convincing the Tribunal that the acts for which the vessel was seized happened

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\(^1\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, p. 1.
\(^2\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, p. 24.
\(^3\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, p. 15.
\(^4\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, p. 15.
within its jurisdiction, in order to evade responsibility under the Convention. Why is
Italy claiming that the activities which the Decree of Seizure was targeting happened
within Italy’s territory? It is simple: Italy knows that as a Party to the Convention it
cannot arrest a vessel flying a foreign flag for activities performed on the high seas,
even if the actual arrest happened in port. That is a contravention of the freedom of
navigation; and that, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, is exactly what
happened in this case.

Ms Klein will discuss in more detail the facts and evidence that prove, uncontestably,
that article 87 was violated in the present case.

Panama also claims that Italy violated article 300 in connection with Italy’s violation
of article 87. Although Italy claims that Panama has failed to demonstrate a link
between articles 87 and 300, this is again a blatant distortion of Panama’s position
and another attempt to minimize clear arguments to the contrary. I will briefly go
back to this point, in a few minutes.

Panama claims as well that reparation is due for all the damages incurred as a
consequence of Italy’s violation of its obligations under the Convention. My
colleague, Mr von der Wense, will address this point later in our submissions.

In relation to the claim for reparation, Italy repeatedly suggested that the vessel was
in a bad state already at the time of its arrest, in 1998. It provided, however, no
convincing evidence of such claim – none whatsoever. What stems clearly from the
record is that the “Norstar” was a fully operational and well-functioning ship.
Panama’s witnesses, Mr Morch, Captain Husefest and Mr Rossi, testified about the
seaworthiness and well-maintained condition of the vessel. To recall Mr Morch’s
testimony, he made it clear that:

[d]uring the operation in the offshore market with supply of gasoil to mega
yachts, maintenance and presentation of a ship in good condition was always
important. The vessel was always clean, newly painted and very well
maintained … There were no outstanding items from DnV when the ship
arrived at Palma de Mallorca with gasoil from Malta in April 1998. … Also the
cargo tanks were completely cleaned, and, if necessary, painted prior to
loading. … Only clean products could be delivered to mega yachts. Samples
were taken during each delivery, as this was part of the routine5.

Concerning the seaworthiness of the “Norstar” in the period prior to the arrest, we
also heard unequivocal testimony, from Mr Morch and also from Captain Husefest
and Mr Rossi, that the vessel was navigating in perfectly well-maintained condition.
In response to my question in this regard, Mr Morch stated on Monday that

[t]he ship had, prior to the Italian arrest, all valid certificates such as
Panamanian national certificate, trading certificate, load line certificate, and
had passed the annual survey in 1997.

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5 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/1, p. 28.
The ship was during summer 1998 bunkering mega yachts in a designated position given by Spanish authorities, 24 nautical miles between Mallorca and Ibiza.

Panama has also provided photos of the vessel, dating prior to the arrest, which essentially corroborate Mr. Morch’s testimony about the state of the vessel. It has submitted charter contracts. The evidence in the record is abundant in this regard. Italy has tried to discredit Panama’s witnesses, suggesting that their testimony should be questioned. The fact remains that their testimony prove that the vessel was fully operational at the time of its arrest, and would continue to be, if it were not for Italy’s unlawful detention of the vessel.

Importantly, Italy’s own expert witness, Mr. Matteini, in cross-examination was asked to review the photos submitted by Panama regarding the vessel prior to the arrest. When confronted with the pictures, Mr. Matteini affirmed, unequivocally, that:

> The deck … the feed lines and the castles, was in good maintenance order … this is the engine cabinet. It is quite clean. You can see the dashboard and the engine portion. For sure, had the vessel looked like that, then my evaluation would have been different.

In other words, the vessel “was in good maintenance order”. Those were the exact words of Italy’s own expert. That is clear, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal. He also stated, unequivocally, that he had not seen these picture of the vessel before, and that had he seen these photos his evaluation “would have been different” – again, his exact words. Now, it is not difficult to understand why Italy did not show these pictures to Mr Matteini before – or that Mr Matteini had not seen these pictures before. Obviously, he would have provided a different valuation of the vessel, as he stated – one that is not convenient for Italy’s deceptive and distorted arguments about the state of the vessel.

Panama asks: what has Italy demonstrated? Italy filed photos of the ship, which, Panama has made abundantly clear in these proceedings, dated from at least a decade after the arrest took place. I will simply recall again that Italy’s own expert Mr. Matteini referred to these photos and clarified that “The date that the photograph is taken, and this should not be mixed up to be sure of when it was posted on the website … but if there is a date, that is referred to the photograph that is being shown.”

During Mr Morch’s examination on Monday, he confirmed that the pictures Italy submitted to this Tribunal date from more than 10 years after the vessel had been in detention.

Continuing on the question of the damages suffered as a result entirely of Italy’s conduct, Italy has also tried to claim that Panama and the shipowner have,

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6 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/1, p. 29.
7 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/8, p. 22.
8 Ibid.
10 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/1, p. 29.
essentially, been the cause of their own misfortune. Why? Because they failed to maintain the vessel, and retrieve the vessel in 1999, and in 2003. Panama has already addressed these claims in its written and oral pleadings, as well as, importantly, through oral testimony. I will limit myself today to affirming three points:

First, it was Italy, and not the shipowner or Panama who had the responsibility to maintain the vessel after its arrest. This is not only a legal conclusion, but it is also a logical one. If Italy had total control over the “Norstar” after its arrest – and we have heard Mr Morch state that access to the vessel was denied, “everything was locked” – then it can only be Italy that has the obligation to maintain the vessel in good working order during the detention. In response to Judge Pawlak’s question, Mr Esposito, Italy’s own expert, confirmed that: “The general rule is that whoever has issued the seizure order... is in charge of the whole situation.” In fact, “If Italy arrests a ship” whoever has issued the seizure order is responsible for taking care of the ship.”

Secondly, it also became clear during these proceedings, through the examination of witnesses, that Italy had the obligation to name a custodian, and that this person was responsible for the vessel after its arrest (in Mr Esposito’s words: “The responsibility actually moves from the Public Prosecutor to the custodian.”) Well, we do not know that any custodian was appointed in this case. Mr Morch, in response to a question posed by Judge Lucky, confirmed that there was no information about a custodian being appointed to oversee the ship. But we do know that no one, I repeat not the Public Prosecutor, not a potential custodian, took care of the ship, which led to its ultimate deterioration.

Thirdly, I will restate that in 1999, it was a conditional release against a bond of 250,000,000 lira. We heard from Mr Morch’s testimony that, regarding the payment of the amount of the bond: “[t]he owners had no option. They could not pay the bond. In this situation all involved had to wait until the Public Prosecutor had lost his case.”

He further stated that:

The MV “Norstar” could not continue its commercial activity after the arrest and thus was not in a position to secure its release. Inter Marine Company S/A had no other ships to compensate for the loss of income... [It] also did not have any option to provide security through its bank... Therefore, the owner had neither the opportunity to pay the bond or to provide a bank guarantee.

So we have evidence, the sworn testimony of Mr Morch, that the shipowners were not in a financial state to pay the bond.

Panama thus makes two assertions in regard to the vessel at this point. The first is that it has been proven in this case, through, *inter alia*, the testimony of various

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11 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/8, p. 10.
12 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/8, p. 10.
14 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/1, p. 36.
15 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/1, p. 37.
witnesses, that the vessel was in perfect working condition prior to the arrest. Italy’s arguments are totally contradictory on this point. I ask again: if the vessel was in the derelict condition that Italy describes, how could a bond of 250 million lira (approximately €125,000) be placed on it? The answer is simple – the vessel was a perfect working vessel, for which Italy had requested this significant amount of money for its release.

The second assertion is that the vessel, unsurprisingly, deteriorated after its arrest and due to Italy’s own fault, for having failed to “take care” of the ship when it had the legal obligation to do so after it had (albeit unlawfully) arrested the vessel and kept it under its control for an unreasonably long period of time. For these reasons, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, Italy has to repair the damages caused to Panama.

I turn now to Italy’s argument regarding remedies under domestic law and its claim that Panama confuses national and international law.

Learned counsel for Italy claimed on Wednesday that Panama failed “to appreciate the relevance to the present dispute of the distinction between domestic law and international law”\(^\text{16}\). This is not only a distortion of Panama’s arguments but it is also another attempt by Italy to muddy the waters in relation to the clear fact that, by its own actions, and specifically the Decree of Seizure, it has contravened the Convention. Panama perfectly understands the relationship between domestic and international law. It also appreciates, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, the relevance of explaining how Italy, through its domestic proceedings, has blatantly violated its international law obligations. Italy is ready to state its commitment to respect international law and “international adjudication”\(^\text{17}\).

Italy’s expert, Mr Esposito, stated that the Public Prosecutor is bound by international law and that a “Decree of Seizure issued by a Public Prosecutor must comply with Italy’s international law obligations”\(^\text{18}\). That is hardly surprising. However, what has been made clear in these proceedings is that the Decree of Seizure applied to activities having taken place on the high seas. Of this fact, there can be no doubt. This is not, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, in compliance with Italy’s obligations under international law.

Rather than this unfounded and unsustained claim that Panama “confuses” domestic and international law, Panama asks the Tribunal to focus on the true reason why Italy insists, against the clear text of the Decree of Seizure, contrary to all the evidence Panama has presented, despite the clear testimony of Panama’s witnesses (Mr Rossi, Mr Morch and Captain Husefest), that the Decree of Seizure was directed at activities having taken place on Italian territory. The reason is clear: Italy knows too well that to issue a Decree of Seizure concerning activities on the high seas is a clear violation of article 87. This is the reason for insisting that Panama confuses the Decree of Seizure and its execution.

\(^{16}\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, p. 4.
\(^{17}\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, p. 1.
\(^{18}\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/8, p. 6.
The Parties agree that the Decree was enforced in Spain. In fact, Panama has never argued that the Decree was enforced elsewhere than in the port of Spain. Panama also knows very well that the port of Spain is not the high seas. But this argument misses the point. The key question in this case, however, is that the activities concerned by the Decree, entirely legal as they were, occurred on the high seas, beyond the zones of jurisdiction of Italy, or any other State. We heard oral evidence of this. Mr Morch confirmed it, and so did Mr Rossi. In any event, how can Italy now claim that the activities targeted by the Decree of Seizure were carried out on Italian territory, as the Agent has already explained? What evidence has Italy provided for this assertion? None, whatsoever.

In this regard, Italy also seems to focus on the date on which the Decree was issued, and whether the “Norstar” was on the high seas, or, as Italy claims, in port on the date of issuance. This seems to suggest that according to Italy, if the vessel was on the high seas when the Decree was issued, then it would have constituted a violation of the Convention. Panama agrees. I shall review the evidence on which Italy relies. Italy refers to a newspaper article, which Panama submitted in the proceedings, to say that, “from March 1998 to the date of the article, so August 2015, the ‘Norstar’ never left once the port of Palma de Mallorca”19. Panama’s witness, Mr Morch, was cross-examined about this newspaper article. In response to Italian Counsel, Mr Morch unequivocally stated that the vessel had left during this period to “call the port of Algeria to load the cargo and supply the vessels”. That was his answer. The article is thus, “definitely wrong” about never having left the port of Palma for 17 years20.

May I recall that Mr Morch provided to the Tribunal a sworn declaration. He is a credible witness who knows the details of the facts that led to this case. Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, Panama respectfully submits that his testimony should be given more weight than a newspaper article, a vague newspaper article, whose author cannot be examined, or cross-examined in this Tribunal, to ascertain the accuracy of the information, and, importantly, the dates mentioned in the article.

Mr President, considering we are one minute short of five o’clock, and I will turn to another argument, may I suggest that we pause for now?

THE PRESIDENT: Indeed. Thank you very much, Ms Cohen. We have reached five o’clock. The Tribunal will withdraw for a break of half an hour. We will continue the hearing at 5.30 p.m.

(Break)

THE PRESIDENT: Ms Cohen, would you please continue?

MS COHEN: I will now turn to briefly address Italy’s insistence on the availability of local Italian remedies. Indeed, Italy has devoted a great deal of energy to this question, both in its pleadings and during the examination of its expert witness, Mr Esposito. I will not burden the Tribunal with lengthy arguments in this respect and

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19 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/2, p. 6.
20 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/2, p. 6.
will limit myself to just the main points. First, Italy asked its own expert to confirm that
there are available remedies under “Italian law for the damages allegedly caused by
the behaviour of the Italian judiciary”\(^{21}\). However, Panama has never claimed that
there are no available local remedies under Italian law when a miscarriage of justice
has occurred; one would hope that this is the case. Italy misses the point. This
question has been settled in law by the Tribunal in its Judgment on Preliminary
Objections.

So, in insisting that Panama had available local remedies to which it has not
resorted, Italy once again is trying to deviate the attention of the Tribunal to irrelevant
questions and attempting to fault Panama where no fault is due.

I will move on to discuss Panama’s burden of proof and submit that Panama has
amply met its onus to prove the violations of the Convention and the damages due.

Italy makes a number of misplaced and erroneous claims concerning Panama’s
onus and standard of proof. Italy first argues that “Panama advances a significant
number of factual and legal contentions which are unsupported by a sufficient
standard of proof.” Then, Italy claims that Panama “tries to shift the burden of proof
on to the defendant”\(^{22}\) — well, the Respondent, Italy, in this case.

Panama has never denied that as the Applicant in this case it has the legal burden to
prove its claims, and it has done so both through written evidence as well as through
the testimony of witnesses called by both Parties.

Italy affirms that Panama has not met its burden of proof, and this is simply not
correct.

Italy seems itself confused about the evidence which the Tribunal is to take into
account in the present case. Panama has not only provided written evidence of its
claims but also, and importantly, during the past four days has provided credible,
convincing evidence through the oral statements of all witnesses examined and
cross-examined before this Tribunal. Italy conveniently fails to take into account all of
the evidence presented in this case, both oral and written.

Furthermore, Panama has already argued, both in the written submissions as well as
the first round of these oral proceedings, that while it bears the burden to prove its
case, Italy has failed to provide, in spite of the numerous requests from Panama,
important documents and information that are under the control of Italy and that only
Italy can access, as Panama’s Agent has already stated. This, Mr President,
Members of the Tribunal, is a completely different matter than “shifting the burden of
proof”, as Italy mistakenly claims. As I already noted on Monday, Panama has
requested Italy to provide a copy of the criminal files relating to the Decree of
Seizure and the arrest of the “Norstar”. Italy has refused. Panama was as specific as
it could have been as to what documents it was requesting considering that it had
not seen the entire files. I refer you, Mr President and Members of the Tribunal, to a

\(^{21}\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/7, p. 24.
\(^{22}\) ITLOS/PV.18/C25/5, pp. 9, 10.
note verbale filed in the record of the case, dated 27 August 2018. Respectfully, the receipt of these files is a matter still pending before the Tribunal.

Panama has continuously and tirelessly tried to obtain more clarity about the criminal process that took place in Italy. In light of the refusal of Italy to comply with Panama’s requests and to provide any clarification in these hearings, or at any time in these proceedings in relation to Panama’s requests, Panama has resorted to Italy’s expert witness, Mr Esposito, to seek to obtain some answers. Alas, as it turned out, Mr Esposito was also unaware of the details of the criminal investigation, the evidence available to the Public Prosecutor, or the motivation of the Public Prosecutor who issued the Decree of Seizure. He does not know. So who knows about this evidence, this motivation? Panama remains in the dark in relation to the specific files and evidence related to the criminal process in Italy.

The same is the case regarding the logbooks and documents that were in the vessel. These are documents containing very relevant information about the ship. Where are these logbooks? Italy, once again, did not give back the logbooks to the shipowner or Panama. What is even more astonishing is that Italy now pretends that it was not its responsibility to have these books or to give them back. How can that be the case when Italy detained the ship when the logbooks were inside it and neither the shipowner, the crew members or Panama had an opportunity to retrieve them? How can an alleged investigation into an alleged crime take place without examining a ship’s documents and its logbooks?

In response to a question put to him by Judge Lijnzaad concerning the “ship’s documents such as the papers relating to its IMO certificate or logbook”, Mr Esposito answered that “the asset is not available anymore; it is arrested.” He also confirmed, importantly, that the “same thing goes for the upkeep. If … the custodian cannot go ahead with the upkeep of the boat, then the Public Prosecutor is still the decision-maker of the situation”.

But the absurdity of the Italian conduct does not stop there. Italian counsel, in cross-examination of Mr Morch on Monday, repeatedly asked about very specific information of very specific dates of the whereabouts of the “Norstar” in the summer of 1998. Allow me to remind you, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, that the dates in question are from approximately 20 years ago. Had Panama or the shipowner obtained access to the logbooks of the “Norstar”, all the information so insistently requested by Italian counsel would be readily available.

If the referred documents and information are under the sole control of Italy, how can Panama possibly have access to them? The answer is simple – it cannot. In response to a question by Judge Lucky, we heard Mr Morch state that the area was completely closed after the detention in Palma de Mallorca. We had no access to anything; it was denied. We could not pass the gate because it was closed … it was impossible to go on board the ship. Everything was closed. The keys were taken and everything was closed.

23 ITLOS/PV.18/C25/8, p. 8.
Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, I thank you for your kind attention this afternoon. With your permission, Mr President, I would now like to call Ms Mareike Klein, Advocate for Panama, to continue Panama’s submissions on article 87 of the Convention.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Cohen. I now give the floor to Ms Klein. Ms Klein, you have the floor.

MS KLEIN: Distinguished President, Members of the Tribunal, it is an honour for me to plead one last time before you on behalf of the Republic of Panama, my country, in the M/V “Norstar” Case.

During the past two days we have heard Italy argue that article 87 of UNCLOS on the freedom of navigation does not apply, for two reasons. First, Italy states, that the arrest of the “Norstar” was due to its activities in territorial waters, not for activities carried out on the high seas. Second, Italy contends that article 87 only applies if there is a physical interference on the high seas and not if a vessel is arrested in port. According to Italy, in port vessels are not protected by the right to freedom of navigation.

I will address now Italy’s first argument, and I want to make this very simple. The reasons for the arrest are stated in the Decree of Seizure. You can find the Decree of Seizure in Annex 3 of the Memorial of the Republic of Panama and you can also see it now on screen. Let us read that order again together, because I would like to comment on the main parts.

The Decree of Seizure dated 11 August 1998 reads:

It was also found that the M/V “Norstar” positions itself beyond the Italian, French and Spanish territorial seas, mostly inside the contiguous vigilance zone and promptly supplies with fuel (so-called “offshore bunkering”) mega yachts that are exclusively moored at EU ports. Thus, they willingly and consciously give the sold product a destination that differs from the one for which the tax exemption was granted … while being fully aware that the product will certainly be subsequently introduced into Italian territory and that no statement for customs purposes is issued by the purchasers.

Let me rephrase this part of the Decree. According to this part of the Decree, the “Norstar” did bunker other vessels offshore. Those other vessels would then return to Italian customs territory without issuing a statement for customs purposes, thereby evading taxes, according to this Decree; and the persons connected to the “Norstar”, like Captain Husefest, are accused of being aware that the other vessels that the “Norstar” supplies with fuel offshore, after being bunkered, return to territorial waters of Italy without issuing a statement for customs purposes.

This means that the “Norstar” was arrested and the persons connected to it accused, because it was doing offshore bunkering. The Decree even goes further, stating the rationale behind this, to justify the seizure. Let us continue reading:

Having noted that the seizure of the mentioned goods must be performed also in international seas, and hence beyond the territorial sea and the contiguous
vigilance zone, given that: actual contacts between the vessel that is to be arrested and the State coast were proved ... which implied infringements of the customs and tax legislation as a result of the previous sale of smuggled goods in the State territory (so-called “constructive or presumptive presence”).

We can therefore see that the Decree of Seizure explicitly refers to the constructive presence doctrine as the basis for its jurisdiction. What does constructive presence mean? Here is a definition from a dictionary:

The doctrine of constructive presence allows a coastal State to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign flag vessel that remains seaward of coastal State waters but acts in concert with another vessel (contact vessel) ... that violates coastal State laws in waters over which the coastal State may exercise jurisdiction. In order to exercise jurisdiction over a “mother ship” located seaward of coastal State waters, the contact vessel must be physically present in coastal State waters or be subject to coastal State jurisdiction under the doctrine of hot pursuit.

So in this case it means that the “Norstar” was the mother ship, which operated on the high seas, and that the vessels bunkered by the “Norstar” returning to territorial waters of Italy were the contact vessels because they came into contact with the coastal State’s jurisdiction and were subject to hot pursuit. The Decree even makes reference here, as we can see, to article 111 of UNCLOS on hot pursuit. The other day, one of Italy’s counsel suggested that a reason why the “Norstar” was allegedly arrested for activities carried out in territorial waters was that the Decree relied on the doctrine of hot pursuit. However, what Italy failed to see here is that the right to hot pursuit originates from the contact vessels, those returning to the territorial waters, and not the “Norstar”, the mother ship operating on the high seas.

Therefore, the doctrine of constructive presence, the basis for this Decree of Seizure, as we can read, takes by itself a holistic approach, and now Italy tries to wrongly separate the elements of this holistic approach.

This is the rationale behind the Decree of Seizure. This is not some supplementary document, but the Decree of Seizure itself relies on the doctrine of constructive presence, as we have just read together.

The use of this doctrine in the Decree of Seizure in itself proves that the “Norstar” was not seized for activities in the territorial waters of Italy. There would have been no need to make explicit reference to the doctrine of constructive presence if the vessel was seized for activities in territorial waters, because there would be no element of transshipping, otherwise referred to as mother vessel and contact vessel.

For the last two days, Italy has relied on the argument that the “Norstar” was arrested for activities carried out in its territorial waters. Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, this is clearly not what this Decree of Seizure, which is at the heart of this dispute, actually says.

Furthermore, the doctrine of constructive presence is inextricably linked to the concept or existence of the contiguous zone, a zone to which the Decree makes
reference. The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, under “Hovering Acts” states the following:

It is apparent that the modern doctrine of the contiguous zone, as recognized both in treaty and customary international law, has its historical origins in the hovering acts promulgated by Great Britain and other countries. ... There is also an echo of the early hovering acts in the formulation and interpretation of the doctrine of constructive presence for the purposes of the exercise of the right of hot pursuit in the modern law of the sea. In its orthodox manifestation this permits pursuit of a vessel which had not been in the zone of national jurisdiction in question but which had used its boats to carry out prohibited activities there.

Of course, no prohibited activities were carried out in this case.

Well, Italy based the entire Decree of Seizure on the assumption that it could also exercise its jurisdiction for custom matters in the contiguous zone. This is what this means.

All of this to tell you, Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, that Italy did not even have a contiguous zone at that time, and this fact has been undisputed throughout these proceedings by Italy. You can find the proof in Annex 7 of the Memorial of the Republic of Panama, containing a letter from Telespresso dated 4 September 1998 issued by the Service of Diplomatic Litigation, Treaties and Legislative Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy to the prosecutor who signed the Decree of Seizure in front of you, stating:

I note that the Contiguous zone exists when a State officially promulgates it but Italy did not avail herself of this opportunity. Our law actually provided till 1974 a contiguous zone of 6 miles over the territorial waters ... according to the Geneva Convention ... on the territorial sea.

Later [so from 1974 onwards] the territorial waters became 12 miles so the contiguous zone was [e]nglobed in the territorial sea. For this reason at the moment [1998] ... the only zone under the State control is the territorial sea.

Therefore, the “Norstar” was operating always on the high seas and was arrested for it.

Moreover, the Decree explicitly makes reference to the activities carried out on the high seas:

the so-called “genuine link”, which underlies the mentioned international law institution, unequivocally emerges from the overall content of the investigations ordered, as summarized above: the repeated use of adjacent high seas by the foreign ship was found to be exclusively aimed at affecting Italy’s and the European Union’s financial interests.

Italy has throughout these proceedings denied any foreign element in connection with the seizure, but this Decree, as we have just read, proves the contrary. The
prosecutor refers explicitly to this “link”, which in this situation means the element of transshipment.

I will now respond to Italy’s second argument, that article 87 only applies if there is physical interference on the high seas, and not if a vessel is arrested in port. According to Italy, in port vessels are not protected by the right of freedom of navigation.

First of all, I would like to clarify that Panama’s position when referring to the right to navigate again towards the high seas, is of course based on the fact, that in this case, the “Norstar” was arrested for lawful activities performed on the high seas, as established before. That is the difference between the M/V “Norstar” and the M/V “Louisa” Case, and Panama’s position is the fact that the “Norstar” was seized for activities carried out on the high seas, that alone already triggers a violation of article 87 on the freedom of navigation, especially because the Decree states that the authorities would be ready to interfere, and would be justified in interfering, for the same purpose, on the high seas.

Does the freedom of navigation not protect Panama, the flag State, from such measures? Because the Decree of Seizure is a measure.

In the Dissenting Opinion on the M/V “Louisa” Case, Judge Wolfrum states the following when it comes to the protection of the rights of coastal States:

It is hard to imagine how the arrest of a vessel in port in the course of national criminal proceedings can be construed as violating the freedom of navigation on the high seas. To take this argument to the extreme it would, in fact, mean that the principle of the freedom of navigation would render vessels immune from criminal prosecution since any arrest of a vessel, under which ground whatsoever, would violate the flag State’s right to enjoy the freedom of navigation.

This opinion demonstrates how a rule would utterly fail to protect the interests of coastal States. The opposite extreme would be a rule that completely fails to protect the interests of flag States.

Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, what would be the opposite extreme of that example? The opposite extreme is if the coastal State orders the arrest of a vessel in a port for its activities carried out on the high seas, which in this case were completely lawful, and if this would not trigger a breach of article 87, because a violation of article 87 would encompass only arrests that have taken place on the high seas. It would mean, in fact, that a coastal State could circumvent article 87 on the freedom of navigation and be free to abuse its right to seize vessels for this purpose by waiting to arrest them in port. The coastal State could rely on the concept that article 87 can only be breached if the interference takes place on the high seas. That is the other extreme.

Italy is holding on precisely to that argument. Italy has stated in its pleadings that a violation of article 87 on the freedom of navigation requires interference, which, according to Italy, did not occur in this case. Italy thereby contended that the term “interference” refers to interference on the high seas. So according to this contention,
Italy avoided interference, in form of a seizure, by arresting the vessel in a port of a third State but, as mentioned before, the Decree emphasizes that the authorities would be justified and ready to interfere, for the same purpose, on the high seas.

Without prejudice to the aforementioned, I would like to say one more thing on a form of actual interference with the bunkering activities of the “Norstar” on the high seas prior to its arrest. Mr President, with all due respect, would you allow me to clarify briefly the relevance of the harassment incidents described by former Captain Mr Husefest in his witness testimony?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MS KLEIN: The forms of harassment described by the witness testimony of Mr Husefest do represent a form of interference on the high seas, while the “Norstar” was carrying out its bunkering activities, and that is why it is relevant to the argumentation of this case. Contrary to what one of the Italian counsel suggested, that there is no evidence, well, a witness testimony is a form of proof.

Let me now come to my last point on the Decree of Seizure. When it comes to reviewing the measures taken by Italian national authorities, I would like to address the Decree’s probationary nature.

Yesterday Mr Esposito answered several questions on probative seizures. Let me recite his statement concerning probative seizures:

In this case [of a probative seizure] the judicial police officer must write a report in which he must, for example, write in detail everything … we need to have a report and then the Public Prosecutor must read the report and then he can confirm the seizure.

From Mr Esposito’s statement we can deduce that there must be some degree of reasonableness in order for the prosecutor to confirm the seizure, in particular because the prosecutor must be presented, as Mr Esposito said, with a “detailed report” before confirming it.

But what does reasonableness mean in international law? Yesterday one of Italy’s counsel mentioned already the meaning of reasonableness in his pleading, and Panama agrees with the definition, saying that

If we look for guidance in order to identify the contents of the international standards of due process in the specific context of the law of the sea, the “Duzgit Integrity” case is of particular relevance. There, the tribunal observed that the exercise of enforcement powers by a coastal State is governed by the principle of reasonableness. The tribunal specified that: “This principle encompasses the principles of necessity and proportionality”.

So, in international law, reasonableness encompasses the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Let us go back to the Decree of Seizure and see what the Decree tells us about the use of this principle in this case.
The second page of the Decree of Seizure reads as follows:

Having noted that the seizure of the mentioned goods must be performed, as it has an intrinsic probationary nature, with no need to assess whether the order is necessary (reference to domestic case-law: Cass.SS.UU…).

The Decree is basically saying that this probative seizure does not even entail a minimal assessment of necessity for issuing the order. I respectfully ask this learned Tribunal, how can the issuance of this order be in accordance with international standards of due process, be reasonable, if there is no assessment of necessity at all?

Panama respectfully asks this Tribunal to take due note of that provision in the Decree when reviewing this measures taken by Italian national authorities, and whether they acted in conformity with international law, in accordance with principles such as necessity, reasonableness and appropriateness.

I now am at the end of my pleading, and would respectfully ask you Mr President, to call Mr von der Wense to continue Panama’s pleadings. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Klein. I now give the floor to Mr von der Wense to make a statement.

MR VON DER WENSE: Thank you, Mr President. Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, in the next few minutes I would like to discuss the oral statements and the testimonies of the witnesses, as far as they concern the question of the compensation of damages.

Italy objects that Panama has not proved all the facts that are the basis of the action. However, despite the considerable difficulties involved in the burden of proof after a lapse of 20 years, Panama has provided numerous documents in this process that are capable of proving the important facts.

Of course, it is not only possible to prove facts through written documents only. The Rules of the Tribunal expressly provide, inter alia, in article 44 and article 72 and the following, that the parties may also provide evidence by witnesses or experts. This evidence has an equal value.

The testimonies of the witnesses called by Panama in this case, Mr Morch, Mr Rossi and Mr Husefest, were particularly strong evidence because the witnesses were directly involved in the events surrounding the “Norstar” and had extensive knowledge of the facts concerning the vessel and its activities. During my work as a lawyer I have heard numerous witnesses who could only insufficiently answer the questions they had been asked, because they only noticed the events marginally. By contrast, the testimonies we heard here were comprehensive, informative, and credible in every way.

Italy has complained that the witnesses had partially read off their answers. I would like to remind Italy that in the consultations between the Tribunal and the
representatives of the Tribunal on 26 June 2018 the President informed the Parties that for translation purposes each Party was asked to transmit to the Registrar, at the latest one hour before the hearing, copies of all oral statements to be made by witnesses and experts by the Party on that day. It was not only optional but necessary that the witnesses prepared their answers in writing, and that is exactly what the witnesses did, but then it does not matter if the witnesses have read their answers or recited them by heart. The only thing that matters is that the answers are the truth of what the witnesses asserted in their solemn declaration. There is absolutely no reason to doubt that the witnesses spoke the truth.

Italy also doubted the accuracy of the expert’s report given by Horacio Estribí. However, these doubts are unfounded. First of all, I should like to emphasize that the expert, Mr Estribí, was asked to give an economically valid calculation of the damage, including the complex calculation of the interests, which is of considerable importance here due to the long time span. This is why Mr Estribí was called as an economic expert.

The fact that some figures have changed in comparison to previous calculations is simply because Mr Estribí was not involved in the case from the outset and has made a more accurate and detailed interest calculation and that some calculation bases - such as the legal fees - have changed during the procedure. However, these bases of calculation are not a question of calculation, but have been proved by witnesses and other evidence.

Mr President, Members of the Tribunal. I now come to the question of compensation, in particular the condition of the vessel at the time of the arrest.

As you remember, we saw various photos of the vessel in the course of the hearings. These photos can be divided into two groups: The first group are photos filed by Panama that show the “Norstar” in a very good condition, which is undisputed. I will show you one of these photos now on the screen. And you will find it also in Annex 1 of the printout of my statement, as well as the whole set in Annex 4 of the Reply of Panama. Italy has expressed the opinion that these photos show a “brand new” vessel in the Oral Statement. The expert of Italy confirmed yesterday that the photos show a ship in very good condition.

He said:

Looking at these pictures - and I am not talking so much to the hatch that we have just seen – I can see that the deck, for instance, with the manifold of the lines, the lines and the castles, were in good maintenance order. Unfortunately, I had not seen these pictures. This is the engine cabinet. It is quite clean. You can see the dashboard and the engine helping. For sure, had the vessel looked like that, then my evaluation would have been different.

Contradicting himself, he later denied making that statement. However, the protocols thwart the attempt to undo this.

However, Italy claims that these photos date back to 1966, brand new, when the vessel was new.
This is not correct. Rather, these photos show the “Norstar” shortly before the arrest, proving that the “Norstar” was in very good and seaworthy condition at that time. The photos were taken in the short period in which the “Norstar” of the charterer Nor Maritime Bunker Ltd. was used for bunkering activities, that is between 20 June 1998 and 24 September 1998.

The witness Arve Morch has explicitly confirmed this in his interrogation and has therefore proved this fact.

But you can also recognize this by another detail. Please look at the enlargement of the photo I have just shown to you, and I show also on the screen. On this photo you can see a car in the background. This is obviously not a model from the 60s, 70s or even 80s.

Thus, the testimony of Mr Morch, together with the analysis of the photos – it has been proved that these photos are not captured in 1966, as Italy claims, but show the “Norstar” shortly before the arrest, and that they are in very good shape and seaworthy state. Italy has even acknowledged that the “Norstar” on these photos was not only in a very good condition, but looks like “brand new”.

Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, let us now turn to the photos taken by Italy as evidence of the ship’s poor condition at the time of the arrest.

The photos that Mr Matteini showed can be seen in the webcast protocols. He has commented on these photos that they are no longer available on the Internet. Well, we did a research tonight, and this is the first of several allegations by Mr Matteini that are not correct.

In Annex 2 of my present statement you will find current excerpts from the internet, which show these photos to which Mr Matteini referred yesterday. He has confirmed that he has based his calculations on the fact that these photos show the condition of the “Norstar” at the time of the arrest. Mr Matteini has also confirmed that the photos show the vessel in a state of decay.

Italy claims that these photos were taken in some cases in the period before the arrest and should therefore prove that the “Norstar” was in a very poor condition at the time of the arrest.

The fact that the photos show the “Norstar” in a very bad condition corresponds to the presentation of both parties and is therefore undisputed. The only dispute is about the dates when the photos were taken.

Contrary to Mr Matteini’s claim, however, these photos do not show the ship before the arrest or shortly after.

As you can see from screenshots in Annex 2 of my statement, these photos come from the Internet. As I said, we did research tonight, and what you see on the screen is the actual live image from the Internet and not the printout. Perhaps you can see it on your printout a little bit better. We can see here, this photo, for example, you can see was captured on 25 October 2004. If you go to the left please, with the mouse:
“Captured 25 October 2014.” And added on the right column, you can see that it was added on 7 November 2014.

If we take the next one, we see the same result. We see this picture was taken in 2010 and it was added in 2012.

For the sake of completeness we can have a quick look at the next two photos, please. This photo was taken in 2012; the next one please. This is marinetransfer – the web page that Mr Matteini explicitly referred to – and you will see that in the right column this photo was taken, in the right column, in 2015, uploaded in 2015. The expert referred to web pages as baltictraffic.com and marinetransfer.com. However, in Annex 2 and on the screen you are seeing the original source of these photos, which were linked to the web pages mentioned by Mr Matteini. These original photos show, as I have shown you shortly before the dates the photos were actually taken.

So we have seen the photos were taken in between 2010 and 2015 and not at the time of the arrest of the vessel.

To prove that the pictures were taken before the time of the arrest, Mr Matteini pointed out that the status of the ship on the website was given as “active” instead of “arrested”. However, this is completely wrong. We may have a look on the Internet again, and this simple look shows, as we can see – this is balticshipping.com and you can see there it is a live picture from the Internet. The status of the ship is actually active. This is rather surprising unless you believe in the resurrection of ships.

Therefore, this information is no proof of the age of the photos.

Also, the websites mentioned are - unlike what Mr Matteini said - no official sites or websites filled with official data. In fact these are internet sites owned by private companies. You can see this from the information attached to the written transcription as Annex 4.

To summarize: the photos and the testimony of the witnesses Arve Morch, Silvio Rossi and Tore Husefest prove that the ship was in a very good, seaworthy state at the time of the arrest and then got worse and worse in the following years due to the arrest, the immobilization and the lack of maintenance.

Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, this leads me to the next important point concerning the statement of the Italian expert, Mr Matteini. This statement is, I must say, anything but sound. In detail:

The first point is that Mr Matteini – partly without his fault - assumed false presuppositions. As Mr Matteini explained, he did not receive all the information from his client - Italy – but only the information that is favourable for Italy, namely the photos showing the ship in a state of decay captured between 2010 and 2015. The other ones, in which the ship is seen in good, seaworthy condition (looking like brand new), were evidently not disclosed to Mr Matteini. This behaviour of Italy is – again – a behaviour of bad faith. Mr Matteini, while contradicting himself, later in his
statement, has clearly confirmed that his assessment of the vessel would have had a very different result if he had known these photos.

Secondly, Mr Matteini does not seem to have any knowledge of the legal requirements for ships like the “Norstar”. This is fatal for the validity of his results since he based his assessments critically on “Norstar”’s failure to comply with the double-hull legal requirements established by the MARPOL 73/78 Convention.

Mr Matteini has stated that his assessment has been considerably lower because of this fact, namely at least 30 per cent plus an additional amount for reclassification purposes.

However, what Mr Matteini does not seem to have tested at all is the fact that the MARPOL Convention 73/78 provisions concerning double-hull are only applicable to oil tankers of a deadweight of 5,000 tonnes and above, or of deadweight of 600 tonnes and above. However, the “Norstar” had – it is undisputed – a deadweight of less than 500 tonnes.

In addition, the application of the aforementioned regulations also fails due to other requirements of MARPOL, for it is undisputed that the ship did not transport heavy oil. In addition, the gasoil was not a cargo but a naval provision.

Obviously, Mr Matteini does not have any knowledge of technical requirements for other potential uses of the vessel, although he has – nebulously enough – stated that there are special regulations for other potential uses. However, this blanket claim is wrong and Mr Matteini could not cite a single regulation allegedly regulating such requirements. I just want to put it right: for example, for the transport of bio-products or waste of the fishing industry, no single special requirements were to be fulfilled. “Norstar” could have been used for this purpose without any further precautions.

Mr Matteini had no knowledge of this.

I may summarize. First, the expert, Mr Matteini, has assumed false assumptions regarding the ship’s condition.

Second, the expert, Mr Matteini, has assumed false legal and technical requirements with regard to the operational capability of the ship.

Third, the expert had never seen the vessel itself.

By contrast, the Olsen report of value is a sound assessment since they had inspected the “Norstar” prior to the arrest and they had photos that were actually from the time prior to the arrest and not 15 years later.

At the end of my statement I would now like very briefly to talk about the question of the causative links.

Italy reiterates its argument that the damage claimed by Panama is too remotely linked. By way of comparison, Italy cites the example of a seaman falling from board and injuring his leg. I can only repeat what I said in the first round: when a ship carrying out bunkering activities is arrested, then it is not only likely, but almost
compelling, that the charterer and the owner suffer a loss of revenue. A comparison with any unlikely damage does not fit in the present case in any way.

Finally, Italy cannot argue that the owner disrupted the causative link by not paying the bond, since the demand for the bond was illegal in terms of Italian domestic law as well the Convention. Italy cannot successfully claim that the owner has broken the link. This brings me to the end of my statement.

I am afraid, due to the lapse of time, I will refrain from my statement about article 300; and I may ask to pass the floor to our Agent Nelson Carreyó, please.

Thank you Mr President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr von der Wense. We have reached 6.25 p.m. and Panama has exhausted all the time allocated. I understand this was the last statement made by Panama during this hearing.

MR VON DER WENSE: Yes.

I would like to pass now to Mr Carreyó.

THE PRESIDENT: Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the Tribunal provides that at the conclusion of the last statement made by a Party at the hearing, its Agent, without recapitulation of the arguments, shall read that Party’s final submissions. A copy of the written text of these submissions, signed by the Agent, shall be communicated to the Tribunal and transmitted to the other Party.

Therefore, I now invite the Agent of Panama, Mr Carreyó to take the floor to present the Final Submissions of Panama.

MR CARREYÓ: Thank you, Mr President. Before doing that I would like to state only briefly that Panama knows that the Tribunal has a precious opportunity to set a precedent in order to avoid similar situations to any other members of the Convention. It has been a long way between 1998 and today and it has involved a great deal of effort and resources. Panama also wants to say that it does not harbour any hard feelings against the members of the Italian delegation and praises their work. As a consequence of the above-mentioned, Panama wishes to express its apologies to all present for any harshness in our written or oral statements, and would like to also express its gratitude to the honourable Judges for patiently listening and asking questions, which we are confident will serve to clarify the debate.

Finally, I would like to express a word of gratitude for the extraordinary work of all the staff of this judicial corporation and Mr Registrar as well. Thank you, Mr President.

Panama requests the Tribunal to find, declare and adjudge:

First, that by inter alia ordering and requesting the arrest of the M/V “Norstar”, in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction and application of its customs laws to bunkering activities carried out on the high seas, Italy has thereby prevented its ability to navigate and conduct legitimate commercial activities therein, and that by filing
charges against the persons having an interest on the operations of this Panamanian vessel, Italy has breached the right of Panama and the vessels flying its flag to enjoy freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to the freedom of navigation, as set forth in article 87, paragraphs 1 and 2, and related provisions of the Convention;

Second, that by knowingly and intentionally maintaining the arrest of the M/V “Norstar” and indefinitely exercising its criminal jurisdiction and the application of its customs laws to the bunkering activities it carried out on the high seas, Italy acted contrary to international law, and breached its obligations to act in good faith and in a manner which does not constitute an abuse of rights as set forth in article 300 of the Convention;

Third, that as a consequence of the above violations, Italy is responsible to repair the damages suffered by Panama and by all the persons involved in the operation of the M/V “Norstar” by way of compensation amounting to US$ 27,009,266.22, as capital, plus US$ 24,873,091.82, as interest, plus €170,368.10, plus €26,320.31 as interest;

Fourth, that as a consequence of the specific acts on the part of Italy that have constituted an abuse of rights and a breach of the duty of good faith, as well as based on its procedural conduct, Italy is also liable to pay the legal costs derived from this case.

Mr President, I forgot to mention something important, which I also may have asked Mr von der Wense to say, namely that Panama, in a document that it has filed there, has requested United Nations in New York to pay Panama’s costs, and we are waiting for an answer. I think that it would be unethical not to disclose in these proceedings that Panama has also requested that forum to pay the costs of this. In case that happens, I will of course ask you to take it into account.

Thank you, Mr President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Carreyó.

This completes the second round of the oral arguments of Panama. The hearing will be resumed tomorrow at 3 p.m. to hear the second round of oral arguments of Italy.

The sitting is now closed.

(The sitting closed at 6.33 p.m.)