INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

2017

Public sitting
held on Tuesday, 7 February 2017, at 3 p.m.,
at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg,

President of the Special Chamber, Judge Boualem Bouguetaia, presiding

DISPUTE CONCERNING DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
BETWEEN GHANA AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

(Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire)

Verbatim Record
Special Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

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Judges Rüdiger Wolfrum
Jin-Hyun Paik
Judges ad hoc Thomas A. Mensah
Ronny Abraham
Registrar Philippe Gautier
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THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French): The Tribunal will resume its session by continuing to hear the oral pleadings of Ghana. I will immediately give the floor to Professor Reichler, but first let me say that we are beginning at 3 p.m., and we will finish at 6 p.m., with a 30-minute break at 4.30 p.m., resuming at 5 p.m.

You have the floor, Mr Reichler.

MR REICHLER: Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, I now turn to the last relevant circumstance alleged by Côte d’Ivoire, which is the, in English translation, “exceptional concentration of hydrocarbons in the area”.¹ This is a rather brazen argument, and it makes clear what Côte d’Ivoire’s approach is really based on. Their case boils down to this: there is oil out there, and Côte d’Ivoire wants it, so you should treat that as a relevant circumstance and draw the boundary in such a way that Côte d’Ivoire gets some of the oil. In fact, Mr President, that is exactly why we are here before you: there is oil out there, and Côte d’Ivoire wants access to it.

The rest of their case is just window dressing, and it has led Côte d’Ivoire to adopt one indefensible position after another, as Professor Sands showed you.

Realizing finally that their plea for an angle bisector is hopeless, they resort in the alternative to what they call an “adjustment” of the equidistance line, but their use of the word “adjustment” is dramatically understated. This is no mere adjustment; it is a wholesale transformation, replacing a line that runs in one direction, to the south-west, with another line that runs in a completely different direction, to the south-east.

Côte d’Ivoire asks you to do this on the assertion that the presence of “an exceptional concentration of hydrocarbons”² is a relevant circumstance.³ That is not only not the law today, but contrary to it. No court or arbitral tribunal – not a single one – has ever ruled that the presence of hydrocarbons was a relevant circumstance, or has adjusted an equidistance line or any other provisional delimitation line based on the presence of hydrocarbons in the disputed area.

The ICJ provided the most recent guidance on this point in Nicaragua v. Colombia, where it rejected the presence of hydrocarbons as a relevant circumstance, on the ground that: “issues of access to natural resources” must be “so exceptional … to warrant … treating them as a relevant circumstance.”⁴ Côte d’Ivoire argues that access to oil is “so exceptional” in this case because there appears to be a lot of it. But, we say, this cannot be what the Court meant by requiring that access to resources be “so exceptional” in order for it to be considered a relevant circumstance.

In setting this high standard, the Court was invoking its prior rulings on that issue, and expressly its judgment in the Black Sea case, where it quoted approvingly from

¹ RCI, para. 2.62.
³ RCI, paras 2.66-2.74.
the *Gulf of Maine* case. In *Gulf of Maine*, the Special Chamber rejected the argument of the United States that the boundary should be adjusted to ensure access of US fishermen to their customary fishing areas. It ruled that access to natural resources should be taken into account only in situations where shifting the boundary would be required to avoid “catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned.”

In *Jan Mayen*, the Court determined that this specific requirement was met, because failure to adjust the boundary line would have deprived Denmark of access to fish stocks on which its fishermen were historically dependent. *Jan Mayen* remains the only case in which a court or tribunal has ever adjusted a provisional boundary line to avoid depriving a party of resources that it had historically enjoyed in the past. There is no case in which a line was adjusted in order to allow a State access to resources that it never previously enjoyed.

Côte d’Ivoire struggles to show why access to hydrocarbons should be treated differently than access to fish, and considered a relevant circumstance in the absence of catastrophic repercussions, or where there has been no prior access to these resources and thus no deprivation of them. There is certainly nothing in *Gulf of Maine* or *Jan Mayen* to support Côte d’Ivoire’s attempt to distinguish between access to living and non-living resources. In *Gulf of Maine*, the Special Chamber regarded access to hydrocarbon resources in the same manner as access to fisheries, explaining that its division of “the main areas in which the subsoil is being explored for mineral resources” caused “no reason to fear that any such danger” of catastrophic repercussions would come to fruition.

Côte d’Ivoire cannot show – indeed, it does not even allege – that it would suffer catastrophic repercussions if the customary equidistance boundary were confirmed. There would, in fact, be no repercussions, since a State cannot be deprived of something it never had access to in the first place.

Mr President, this completes my discussion of Côte d’Ivoire’s alleged relevant circumstances. None of the five factors invoked by Côte d’Ivoire even remotely qualifies. They have provided absolutely no basis for making any adjustment of a provisional line.

I turn next, and lastly, to the one circumstance that Ghana considers relevant, and which does justify an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. That relevant circumstance is the practice of the Parties for over 50 years, and the *modus vivendi* that was achieved, to recognize and respect the customary equidistance boundary as the international border between the two States. Of course, Ghana regards this to be much more than a relevant circumstance. In Ghana’s view, the half-century of consistent practice is proof of an agreement between the Parties that a boundary

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7 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246, para. 239.
8 Ibid., para. 238.
exists, that it follows an equidistance line, and that that line is the one we have depicted on our maps as the customary equidistance boundary. It is only in the alternative that we argue that, if a boundary is to be newly delimited by this Special Chamber, the Parties’ 50-year mutual practice should be, at the very least, a relevant circumstance justifying an adjustment to the provisional equidistance line so that the boundary delimited by the Special Chamber is the customary equidistance boundary.

This map, which is also at tab 10, shows how small an adjustment is required. Here is a closer look. Here is an even closer look, zooming in on the territorial sea. At 12 nautical miles, the distance between the two lines, that is, Ghana’s provisional equidistance line and the customary equidistance boundary, is only half a nautical mile. Shortly thereafter, the provisional equidistance line approaches and runs almost concurrently with the customary boundary, until, at approximately 77 nautical miles, the provisional equidistance line crosses the customary equidistance boundary. From that point seaward, it runs slightly to the west of the customary boundary. At 200 nautical miles, the provisional equidistance line lies a mere 0.39 nautical miles, that is, 0.4 miles, west of the customary boundary. The two lines distribute almost the same amount of maritime space to each Party. Within 77 nautical miles, the customary equidistance boundary favours Ghana slightly, giving it approximately 51 square nautical miles more maritime space than the provisional equidistance line. But beyond 77 nautical miles, the customary equidistance boundary favours Côte d’Ivoire a bit more, giving it 67.5 square nautical miles more maritime space than the provisional equidistance line.

The customary equidistance boundary is thus slightly more favourable to Côte d’Ivoire than Ghana’s provisional equidistance line. Nevertheless, it is Ghana’s submission that the provisional equidistance line should be adjusted to conform to the customary equidistance boundary. A half-century of consistent recognition of the customary equidistance boundary by both States cannot be ignored. It cannot mean nothing.

We say, as well, that the Parties’ mutual recognition of the customary equidistance boundary must be considered a relevant circumstance, because it is evidence of what they have both considered to be equitable over the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s, until only a few years ago, when Côte d’Ivoire abruptly abandoned its longstanding position.

In Tunisia v. Libya, the ICJ observed that it “must take into account whatever indicia are available of the line or lines which the Parties themselves may have considered equitable or acted upon as such …”. In that case, the Court found that a line that was employed “separately” by each Party “delimiting the eastward and westward boundaries of petroleum concessions” was a circumstance of “great relevance” and “one of the circumstances proper to be taken in account” in the delimitation.

Here, there can be no question that the Parties did consider the customary equidistance boundary to be equitable at all times prior to the discovery of oil on the Ghanaian side, and that that boundary is, to an even greater extent than the line that

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9 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18, para. 118.
10 Ibid., paras 118, 125.
was employed separately and for a much shorter period by Tunisia and Libya, a circumstance of "great relevance" that should "be taken into account" in the delimitation.

It is Ghana's position that this longstanding practice resulted in a \textit{de facto} or tacit agreement on the customary equidistance boundary. If, \textit{quod non}, the Special Chamber does not consider that the Parties' mutual acceptance of the customary equidistance boundary rises to the level of a binding agreement, then it is surely at least sufficient to establish the existence of a 50-year \textit{modus vivendi} which both Parties long considered equitable, and thus it constitutes a relevant circumstance to be taken into account in adjustment of the provisional equidistance line.

Mr President, for these reasons, Ghana respectfully submits that the Special Chamber should confirm that the boundary within 200 nautical miles is the customary equidistance boundary, as depicted on this map, which is also at tab 11. It starts on the low water line at the point closest to the agreed land boundary terminus at BP 55, and follows an average bearing of 192 degrees. The coordinates of the turning points are shown on the map. Ms Singh will show that this boundary easily passes the disproportionality test in the third stage of the delimitation process.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, I thank you for your patient attention, and ask that you call Ms Singh to the podium.

\textbf{THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French)}: Thank you, Mr Reichler, for your presentation. I immediately give the floor to Ms Anjolie Singh.

\textbf{MS SINGH:} Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, it is an honour to appear before you and a privilege to do so for Ghana once again.

My task this afternoon is to set out Ghana’s case on the maritime boundary between the Parties in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and to respond to Côte d’Ivoire’s written pleadings in this regard. Mr President, the graphics you will see during my presentation are at tab 1 of the Judges’ folders for this afternoon.

The agreement between the Parties on the customary equidistance boundary extending beyond 200 nautical miles is clearly confirmed by – and reflected in – their respective 2009 Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The plate you see depicts the continental shelf entitlements of the Parties beyond 200 nautical miles, separated by the customary boundary that is based on equidistance. In its original submission to the Commission in May 2009, Côte d’Ivoire asserted a claim beyond 200 nautical miles only to the west of the customary equidistance boundary with Ghana.\(^1\) You can see this in purple.

Similarly, and entirely consistently with its own approach, and that of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana’s submission asserted a claim only to the east of that boundary.\(^2\) That is the line in green. In 2009 there was no overlap. This offers a clear confirmation of a fact.

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\(^1\) Memorial of Ghana (4 Sept. 2015) (hereinafter “MG”), Vol. VI, Annex 75 (Côte d’Ivoire, Original Submission to the CLCS (8 May 2009)).

\(^2\) MG, Vol. VI, Annex 74 (Ghana, Submission to the CLCS (28 April 2009)).
that the Special Chamber should take account of, we say: in 2009 the Parties
recognized and agreed on the existence and location of their maritime boundary both
within and beyond 200 nautical miles.

Côte d’Ivoire maintained its 2009 submission for almost seven years, until March
2016. Only then did Côte d’Ivoire – and its lawyers – come to the belated realization
that the position it was arguing before this Chamber was manifestly incompatible
with the submission it had made to the Commission in 2009. Côte d’Ivoire explains
its late change of position by saying that there was no “urgency” to complete its
submission earlier. Indeed, the urgency seems to have been prompted by the
imminent filing date for its Counter-Memorial. So, on 24 March 2016, a mere 11 days
before it filed its Counter-Memorial, Côte d’Ivoire replaced its original submission
with a new revised submission, one that greatly extended the scope of its claim.

Mr President, Ghana’s position on the boundary in the outer continental shelf is the
same as for the boundary up to 200 nautical miles. Ghana’s primary case is that the
Special Chamber should confirm that the customary equidistance boundary is the
maritime boundary and that it extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Ghana’s
alternative case, in the unlikely event that the Special Chamber reaches the view
that there is no customary equidistance boundary beyond 200 nautical miles, is to
delimit a boundary in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. As
Mr Reichler has indicated, this leads to a boundary in the same location as the
customary boundary.

Before I address Côte d’Ivoire’s arguments, I am pleased to say that there are some
significant points of convergence between the Parties. First, the Parties agree that
they have entitlements to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This is, of
course, subject to the Commission’s recommendations regarding Côte d’Ivoire’s
entitlement. Côte d’Ivoire accepts that Ghana’s title is, in its words, “particularly
incontestable”, as the Commission has already adopted recommendations regarding
the outer limits of Ghana’s continental shelf in accordance with article 76(8) of the
Convention. Second, the Parties agree that this Chamber has jurisdiction to delimit
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This is consistent with the practice
of ITLOS and now the ICJ. Third, in principle, they agree on the respective roles of
the Commission and this Chamber. Finally, and importantly, there is agreement that
the same principles of delimitation are to be applied both within and beyond

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3 Rejoinder of Côte d’Ivoire (4 Apr. 2016) (hereinafter “RCI”), para. 3.54.
4 Counter-Memorial of Côte d’Ivoire (4 Apr. 2016) (hereinafter CMCI), Vol. VI, Annex 179. (Côte
d’Ivoire, Revised Submission to the CLCS (Mar. 2016)).
5 Reply of Ghana (25 July 2016) (hereinafter “RG”), para. 4.7; CMCI, para. 8.5: Entitlement to a
continental shelf beyond 200 M, as ITLOS has made clear, is “determined by reference to the outer
edge of the continental margin, to be ascertained in accordance with article 76, paragraph 4”:
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, Judgment, para. 437.
6 CMCI, para. 8.5 (“est d’autant moins contestable”).
7 MG, paras 6.14-6.28; CMCI, para. 8.2.
8 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond
200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
9 MG, para. 6.21 et seq.; CMCI, para. 8.3. The CLCS’s role is to: “draft recommendations the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf” and the Special Chamber is tasked with the:
delimitation between the two States”, both within and beyond 200 M. Both have different but
complementary mandates.
200 nautical miles.\textsuperscript{10} Despite these significant agreements, differences remain on
two issues, and these will be the subject of the rest of my presentation.

First, differences remain on the extent of each Party’s entitlement, particularly in light
of Côte d’Ivoire’s reliance on its revised submission made in 2016 and its
misrepresentation of Ghana’s position in this regard. The second area of difference
is the application of the methodology for the delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles.\textsuperscript{11}
Whether you take Ghana’s primary or alternative argument, Côte d’Ivoire’s
application leads to a result that is neither equitable nor legally defensible.\textsuperscript{12}

I turn now to the Parties’ submissions to the Commission and their respective
entitlements beyond 200 nautical miles. Ghana’s 2009 submission to the
Commission identified two areas beyond 200 nautical miles along the same margin:
the Eastern and Western Extended Continental Shelf Regions.\textsuperscript{13} It is only the
western region that is relevant here, as it is adjacent to the Eastern Extended
Continental Shelf Region of Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{14} The plate that you see now depicts its
outer edges.\textsuperscript{15} As you can see, it is defined by four fixed points: OL-GHA-8,
OL-GHA-7, OL-GHA-4, and OL-GHA-9. You can see that it lies to the east of the
customary equidistance boundary with Côte d’Ivoire. It also lies east of the
provisional equidistance line described by Mr Reichler. At its furthest seaward
extension, Ghana’s continental shelf extends approximately 45 nautical miles
beyond the 200 nautical miles limit.

On 10 March 2014, the subcommission established to examine Ghana’s submission
presented its unanimous recommendations to the Commission. It endorsed three of
Ghana’s four outer limit points. It only refrained from considering the last, most
westerly outer limit fixed point (OL-GHA-9) “in the absence of an international
continental shelf boundary agreement between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire”.\textsuperscript{16} Ghana
accepted the recommendations on the same day. On 5 September 2014, the
Commission adopted the subcommission’s recommendations. It “agree[d] with the
determination of the fixed points [Sed-GHA-7-Rev, OL-GHA-7 and OL-GHA-4]
establishing the outer edge of the continental margin of Ghana in the Western
Region.” The Commission found that Ghana had fulfilled the conditions set out in
article 76.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{10} See MG, paras 6.29-6.34; CMCI, paras 8.22-8.23, 8.25.
\textsuperscript{11} CMCI, paras 8.6, 8.21 \textit{et seq.}
\textsuperscript{12} See e.g. RCI, para. 13; see generally RCI, Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{13} MG, Vol. VI, Annex 74 (Ghana, Submission to the CLCS, p. 10.)
\textsuperscript{14} Côte d’Ivoire agrees. See CMCI, paras 8.7, and footnote 534.
\textsuperscript{15} MG, paras 6.8-6.9 and MG, Vol. VI, Annex 78, (Ghana’s Revised Executive Summary (21 August
2013, Accra), p. 7, which sets out the location of the outer limit fixed points of Ghana’s Western
Extended Continental Shelf Region (Fig. 2): The points are:
- point OL-GHA-8 is located where the sediment thickness formula line intersects with the
  200 nautical miles line measured from Ghana’s territorial sea baseline
- points OL-GHA-7 and OL-GHA-4 are defined by the sediment thickness formula, and
- point OL-GHA-9 is adjacent to the point where the customary equidistance boundary line
  meets the outer limit of the continental shelf.
\textsuperscript{16} MG, para. 6.10.
\textsuperscript{17} MG, paras 6.10-6.11 and Vol. VI, Annex 79 (CLCS, Summary of Recommendations (5 Sept.
It follows from the operation of article 76, paragraph 8, of the Convention that the outer limits of Ghana’s continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles are now firmly established. This is one respect in which this case is unique. It is the first maritime boundary case in which a party before an international court or tribunal has already received recommendations on its outer limits from the Commission, prior to the case being decided. In our respectful submission, this Special Chamber, and indeed any international court, is bound to respect the decision of the Commission on the delineation of the outer limits of national jurisdiction.

Turning to Côte d’Ivoire’s entitlement, this was set out in its original submission to the Commission in May 2009, shortly after Ghana made its submission. It encompassed an area beyond 200 nautical miles, referred to as the “Eastern Extended Continental Shelf Region.” Its outer limits were defined by six fixed points. Taken together, you can see that in 2009 the western limit of Ghana’s outer continental shelf and the eastern limit of Côte d’Ivoire’s outer continental shelf respected the customary equidistance boundary.

Côte d’Ivoire’s original submission also noted the “absence of disputes” at that time. This was correct, and it is significant. Côte d’Ivoire does not dispute that the Parties acted in concert when they made their 2009 submissions. They engaged the same expert to advise them; they used the same vessel to acquire data for their submissions, a vessel that was offered to Côte d’Ivoire by Ghana to meet the deadline for its submission. The Ivorian team boarded the vessel from a Ghanaian port shortly after the Ghanaian team disembarked. Mr President, these are facts that reflect a clear and unambiguous agreement, the existence of an agreed boundary, the absence of a dispute, and the fact that representations made by each side were then relied on by the other.

The lack of a dispute before the Commission in respect of the outer continental shelf continued from 2009 until 2016. When this case was filed in 2014, as matters stood, there was no dispute between the Parties as regards any decision the Commission had to take. When the Commission took its decision in relation to Ghana, there was no dispute. Ghana was able to rely on Côte d’Ivoire’s 2009 submission during the provisional measures phase of these proceedings in March 2015. Côte d’Ivoire did not indicate to the Special Chamber or to Ghana that its 2009 submission was – as it now claims – “a brief initial presentation”, that it was incomplete or wrong, or that it was going to be revised in any way. Once again, Côte d’Ivoire offered a surprise with its revised submission.

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18 CMCI, para. 8.14.
19 MG, Vol. VI, Annex 75 (Côte d’Ivoire, Original Submission (8 May 2009,) p. 6.).
20 MG, para. 6.12; RG, para. 4.22.
21 MG, Vol. VI, Annex 75 (Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Original Submission to the CLCS, p. 5); RG, para. 4.22.
22 CMCI, para. 4.115.
25 CMCI, paras 8.14 (“une brève présentation initiale”).
But perhaps Côte d’Ivoire’s sudden change should not have come as a surprise. After all, you have seen several examples of changes of position coming out of the blue: new methodologies (Meridians 1 and 2, then Bisectors 1 and 2, then adjusted equidistance), new charts, new lines, new claims. On the approach of Côte d’Ivoire, prior practice and agreement may be discarded without consequence.

As a result of its revised submission, since March 2016 the outer continental shelf entitlements of the Parties are now said by Côte d’Ivoire to overlap. On the screen you can see a comparison of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2009 and 2016 submissions. The next image shows the overlap with Ghana’s outer limit points. Four of the six new outer limit points identified by Côte d’Ivoire are almost at the same places as Ghana’s outer limit points. As you can see, RCI.1 overlaps with OL-GHA-4, and so on. Côte d’Ivoire uses its revised submission before you to discard years of common practice and agreement and to create a dispute where none previously existed. However, it cannot simply wish away its original 2009 submission, a document that both strengthens Ghana’s case on the existence of an agreed customary boundary and underscores Côte d’Ivoire’s longstanding recognition of the existence and location of the boundary up to 2009.

Ghana submits that Côte d’Ivoire’s pre-litigation position on the boundary beyond 200 nautical miles, which it maintained consistently for seven years, including a year and a half after these proceedings began, remains on the record and is to be given great weight. Equally, a submission made in 2016, two years into these proceedings, should be treated for what it is: a self-serving and unilateral effort that underscores the significance of what was done in 2009. It cannot add any support to the new claim. This is consistent with international jurisprudence on the weight to be given to pre- and post- litigation statements by the Parties.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, this brings me to the second part of my presentation: the precise location of the boundary in the area beyond 200 nautical miles. Ghana’s position beyond 200 nautical miles is the same as it is within 200 nautical miles. There is an agreed boundary in both areas that is based on equidistance, which both Parties have recognized and respected as the international boundary in their practice until at least 2009. This is the customary equidistance boundary from BP 55 (the land boundary terminus) to the outer limit of national jurisdiction, which lies beyond 200 nautical miles.

In the event that the Chamber considers a fresh delimitation to be necessary, Ghana’s alternative position is that the proper application of the equidistance methodology yields the same result. The provisional equidistance line should be

26 See RG, para. 4.26.
27 As the Revised Submission was silent regarding the current dispute, Ghana has alerted the CLCS to the existence of this dispute and the new overlap in the OCS entitlements of the Parties. See RG, Vol. IV, Annex 145 (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Ghana to the UN to the Secretary General of the UN, No. UN-15 (13 July 2016)).
28 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua (intervening)), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 351, paras 362, 364 (finding that, where the dispute was submitted to the Court in 1986, Honduras’s 1991 letter of protest to El Salvador’s long-standing demonstration of sovereignty over the disputed islands lacked evidentiary value).
29 RG, para. 4.34.
adjusted, as Mr Reichler has explained, based on relevant circumstances, to 
conform to the customary equidistance boundary. The same line should be extended 
along the same azimuth beyond 200 nautical miles. In this regard, I offer two 
preliminary remarks: first, this Chamber’s exercise of jurisdiction in the outer 
continental shelf will not prejudice the rights of any third States, as there are no third 
States that have any entitlements in this area; second, in the light of Professor 
Sands’ and Mr Reichler’s presentations on the methodology for the delimitation 
I shall not address Côte d’Ivoire’s arguments on its contrived angle bisector 
proposal.30 If there is no justification for its application in the area up to 200 nautical 
miles, there can be no justification in its application beyond 200 nautical miles.

Ghana’s position is straightforward and based firmly on jurisprudence. There is in 
law only a single continental shelf, and article 83 of the Convention applies equally to 
the delimitation of the continental shelf both within and beyond 200 nautical miles.31 
Côte d’Ivoire agrees.32 It follows then that the appropriate method for delimiting the 
entire continental shelf remains the same. Once again, Côte d’Ivoire agrees, at least 
in principle.33

This is in line with both of the Bay of Bengal cases.34 In both cases, ITLOS and the 
Annex VII tribunal found that the approach adopted within 200 nautical miles then 
extended to the area beyond. The tribunals followed the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances method for the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 nautical 
miles and then proceeded with the same method beyond 200 nautical miles. In both 
cases, the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles was delimited by extending 
the continental shelf boundary that had been established up to 200 nautical miles, 
generally along the same azimuth.35

We say that that approach is to be applied in this case. Côte d’Ivoire has offered no 
principled position for disagreeing with it. It argues that the same geographical 
circumstances that play a role in the delimitation of the boundary within 200 nautical

30 RCI, para. 3.59-3.62.
31 Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, paras 361, 362; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, Award of 7 July 2014, paras 77, 465.
32 CMCI, paras 8.22-8.23.
33 CMCI, para. 8.23 (“adhère sans réserve ... de principe”).
34 In Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, para. 455, ITLOS held that: “the delimitation method to be employed ... for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles should not differ from that within 200 nm. Accordingly, the equidistance/relevant circumstances method continues to apply for the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.” In Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 465, the Tribunal followed the same approach: “Having adopted the equidistance/relevant circumstances method for the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 nm, the Tribunal [proceeded with] the same method to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.”.
35 In Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, para. 462, ITLOS determined that: “the adjusted equidistance line delimiting both the [EEZ] and the continental shelf within 200 nm between the Parties ... as continues in the same direction beyond the 200 nm limit of Bangladesh until it reaches the area where the rights of third States may be affected.” In Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 478, the Tribunal continued the delimitation line established within 200 nautical miles until it reached the boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar beyond 200 M.
miles are applicable beyond that. Mr Reichler has already shown you that none of 
these supposed “geographical circumstances” is helpful to Côte d’Ivoire up to 
200 nautical miles, and we say that they do not help them any more beyond 
200 nautical miles.

Ghana’s position is that there is an existing boundary which continues beyond 
200 nautical miles. This is confirmed and fully supported by the Parties’ 2009 
submissions to the Commission, which show that there was no overlap, that there 
was agreement. In the event that the Chamber was to disagree with this position, 
Mr Reichler has set out the alternative – the equidistance/relevant circumstances 
method. The equidistance line that he has identified for the continental shelf within 
200 nautical miles, as adjusted very slightly to conform to the customary 
equidistance boundary as a relevant circumstance, should be extended beyond 
200 nautical miles to the limit of the Parties’ national jurisdiction. This is consistent 
with the law and there is no need to depart from it.

There is one caveat to this approach. Ghana notes that any delimitation effected by 
the Special Chamber beyond 200 nautical miles would have to be contingent on the 
Commission finding that Côte d’Ivoire does, in fact, have an outer continental shelf 
entitlement that extends to the established outer continental shelf entitlement of 
Ghana. If the Commission were to reject Côte d’Ivoire’s outer continental shelf 
entitlement, then the boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire would naturally 
terminate at the 200 nautical miles limit, since there would be no possibility of 
overlapping entitlements beyond this point.

Finally, I come to the question of the equitableness of the boundary proposed by 
Ghana. As Mr Reichler has said, under the equidistance/relevant circumstances 
method, this is assessed at the third and final stage of the delimitation process by 
means of the test for disproportionality. The method to be followed is this: First, the 
ratio between the lengths of the Parties’ relevant coasts is determined. As you can 
see, Côte d’Ivoire’s relevant coast is 308 km long and Ghana’s is 121 km. This yields 
a ratio of 2.55:1. Second, the portions of the relevant maritime area allocated to each 
Party by the provisional or adjusted equidistance line are measured and a ratio is 
determined. Here, the provisional equidistance line, adjusted as proposed by Ghana 
to conform to the customary equidistace boundary, allocates 126,790 square 
kilometers to Côte d’Ivoire and 62,757 square kilometers to Ghana. The ratio is

36 CMCI, para. 8.38; RCI, para. 3.50.
37 In its Reply Ghana had noted certain technical limitations in Côte d’Ivoire’s Revised Submissions. 
For example, there are technical limitations concerning the extent to which Côte d’Ivoire can 
demonstrate natural prolongation from its land territory to the outer edge of the margin, given its very 
narrow physical margin. See RG, paras 4.29 and 4.43.
38 See e.g. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 86, 
para. 122:
Finally, and at the third stage, the Court will verify that the line (a provisional 
equidistance line which may or may not have been adjusted by taking into account 
the relevant circumstances) does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by 
reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal 
lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by 
reference to the delimitation line. … A final check for an equitable outcome entails 
a confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime areas is evident by 
comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.
Third, the two ratios are compared to determine if there is a sufficiently
gross disproportion to justify a further adjustment to the boundary line. A ratio of
2.02:1 does not reflect a significantly disproportionate division of the relevant area.

As the International Court said in the Black Sea case, no further adjustment of the
line is required to achieve an equitable solution unless it “lead[s] to any significant
disproportionality by reference to the respective coastal lengths and the
apportionment of areas that ensue.”

The purpose of this exercise is not to ensure a perfectly proportionate result. Instead,
it is intended to guard against a disproportionate result that would render the
proposed delimitation inequitable. In fact, neither the International Court, nor ITLOS
nor any Annex VII tribunal has ever found an adjustment to be required at this stage
of the process. That was true in both the Bay of Bengal cases, where the tribunals
found no “significant disproportion” that would require the shifting of the adjusted
equidistance line to ensure an equitable solution. Accordingly, there is no
disproportion in this case that would justify a further adjustment of the boundary line
at the third stage of the delimitation process.

The boundary that Ghana asks you to confirm from the LBT to the outer limit of
national jurisdiction is an equitable one. The boundary beyond 200 nautical miles
extends from point CEB 7, where it crosses the 200 nautical miles limit to the point
where national jurisdiction ends, at approximately 245 nautical miles along an
average bearing of 192 degrees. This image sets out the entire boundary.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, that concludes my presentation.
I thank you for your attention and request that you call on Professor Klein, as
Ghana’s next speaker.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French): I
thank Ms Singh for her presentation and I give the floor to Mr Pierre Klein. You have
the floor, Professor Klein.

MR KLEIN (Interpretation from French): Thank you very much, Mr President,
distinguished Members of the Special Chamber. I think one hardly needs to recall at
this stage of the proceedings that one of the core arguments of Côte d’Ivoire within
the framework of this current dispute consists in asserting that the practice followed
over the decades by the two Parties lacks all relevance as far as the determination of
their joint maritime boundary is concerned. Our opponents propose in this regard a
wholly particular reading of the facts of the case that hardly corresponds to the
realities. My colleague Fui Tsikata has amply demonstrated that to you yesterday
and today, and I will not revisit that particular point.

36 RG, para. 3.99.
39 RG, para. 3.99.
41 MG, 5.94.
42 Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, para. 499; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, Award of 7 July 2014, para. 497.
Our opponents also assert that, in any event, the factual situation which has been observed on the ground for decades is not likely to produce any legal effect. First, this would be the case as concerns the fact that this situation is inadequate to meet the required conditions in international case law for the conclusion that a tacit agreement in terms of delimitation exists to be reached. I dealt with this question at length this morning and I showed you that there is no element in the relevant case law that could call into question Ghana’s position in this respect. However, the criticisms voiced by our opponents do not stop there; they also claim that the practice of the Parties cannot be taken into account as a circumstance preventing Côte d’Ivoire from calling into question a legal situation which its own behaviour caused to arise between the Parties. It is this last argument – and more broadly how the principle of estoppel comes into play in this case – on which my oral argument this afternoon will be focused.

In Bangladesh v. Myanmar the Tribunal recalled:

in international law, a situation of estoppel exists when a State, by its conduct, has created the appearance of a particular situation and another State, relying on such conduct in good faith, has acted or abstained from an action to its detriment.¹

There is no doubt whatsoever for Ghana that it is a situation of this nature with which it was confronted from the moment when Côte d’Ivoire started to call into question the customary limit based on an equidistance line, that Côte d’Ivoire had accepted as a maritime boundary for over 50 years. As from the provisional measures stage, Ghana set out to what extent this change of position was likely to entail considerable prejudice for it.² Ghana set out in the written pleadings the extent of the damages resulting from the Ivorian volte face. It was by basing itself on the pre-existing situation, characterized by a stable maritime boundary, respected by both Parties over decades, that Ghana granted concessions in the maritime spaces situated to the east of that line. It was in reliance on this same situation that billions of dollars have been invested, above all since the mid-2000s, for exploration and then subsequently for the exploitation of the oil resources present in this area.³ I hardly need to recall as well that the Request for Provisional Measures presented by Côte d’Ivoire led to a partial freezing of activities in the area, and that has already resulted today in numerous job losses and very substantial financial prejudice.⁴ The attempt by Côte d’Ivoire to invoke Ghana’s international responsibility (to which my colleague Alison Macdonald will return shortly) shows that this debate is anything but

¹ Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4 (hereinafter: “Bangladesh/Myanmar, Judgment”), para. 124.
⁴ Second statement of Paul McDade on behalf of Tullow Oil plc (11 July 2017), RG, Vol. IV, Annex 166, para. 7. See also Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Provisional Measures, Order of 25 April 2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, p. 146, para. 99: “in the view of the Special Chamber, the suspension of ongoing activities conducted by Ghana in respect of which drilling has already taken place would entail the risk of considerable financial loss to Ghana and its concessionaires …”).
theoretical. If Côte d’Ivoire were able to get home on this point, it would be a loss of millions of dollars that Ghana would suffer on account of Côte d’Ivoire’s impromptu about-turn. It is precisely this type of result, wholly inequitable, that the principle of estoppel is meant to counter.

However, if you listen to the other side, estoppel has no place in the present case. “[C]learly”, our opponents say with aplomb in their Rejoinder, “Côte d’Ivoire has … never made representations or given Ghana any assurances in which it could have placed its trust or adopted behaviour which would have been detrimental to it.” The other side tries, by introducing, inter alia, particular circumstances, principally the crises that the country has undergone between 1993 and 2009, as justifications for the silence of Ivorian authorities over many years in face of oil exploration and exploitation activities carried out in the border area. On the one hand, there is an absence of representation and on the other a silence, from which no legal consequence can be inferred. What is the reality of all of this?

With respect to the absence of representation, let me invite you, Mr President, distinguished Members of the Special Chamber, to place yourselves in the shoes of the Ghanaian authorities throughout these last decades to better appreciate whether the representations of which Ghana affirms the existence were indeed nothing but a figment of its imagination.

Imagine you have a neighbour who, as of 1970, adopts official decrees signed by the President of the Republic, who tells the whole world – and that includes you – that the region delimited by this text is defined seaward of its coast “by the border line separating the Ivory Coast from Ghana”. Not, Mr President, "by a line which has effect solely with regard to the course of oil concessions". No – "by the boundary line separating Côte d’Ivoire from Ghana", a boundary which, according to the self-same text, follows the equidistance line.

You have a neighbour whose national oil company reports directly to several ministerial departments, regularly publishes charts that show to the whole world – and to you too – that the maritime boundary between your two States follows an equidistance line. Not, Mr President, a limit that only applies to oil concessions but is indeed the seaward extension of the land boundary, including beyond the areas of the concessions.

You have a neighbour who, when they have to carry out seismic surveys in the maritime boundary area, asks your permission to turn around in “Ghanaian waters”, adding to its request a chart that places these waters beyond the line – the same line – the equidistance line, identifying it by the word “Ghana”.

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5 Rejoinder of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (14 November 2016) (hereinafter: “RCI”), para. 5.35.
6 RCI, para. 5.37.
8 Fax from Kassoum Fadika, Société Nationale d’Opérations Pétrolières de la Côte d’Ivoire (PETROCI), to Thomas Manu, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), re authorization for seismic vessel to turn around in Ghanaian waters (9 March 2007), RG, Vol. IV, Annex 137; Email from Boblai Victor Glohi, Société Nationale d’Opérations Pétrolières de la Côte d’Ivoire (PETROCI), to
waters which we know fall to Ghana for the granting of oil concessions". No – "in Ghanaian waters".

You have got a neighbour who, when it presents its submissions to the CLCS, makes for the whole world to see – you included – the extreme limit of the extended continental shelf claimed coincide with the equidistance line referred to so often.\(^9\) Not, Mr President, with some angle bisector line or some meridian – no, with the equidistance line. We are in 2009, 39 years after the adoption by your neighbour of an official text that refers to "the boundary line separating Côte d'Ivoire from Ghana", and which gives it substance as an equidistance line.

But, no, if you listen to Côte d'Ivoire, all of that does not have the least significance whatsoever. You would be totally unreasonable, even dishonest, if you were for one moment to think that that line does indeed represent the boundary separating your maritime territory from that of your neighbour – but a question all the same. If really in all these elements that I have just reviewed there was no representation likely to lead to conviction in the mind of a third party, then why did the Ivorian authorities decide to change – only as of 2011 – the representation of the maritime areas falling under the sovereignty of Côte d'Ivoire in the different documents that they produced? Why did they decide – only in 2016 – to amend the submission that they presented to the CLCS in such a fashion that this submission should be consistent with the new Ivorian claim of a maritime boundary following an angle bisector line? Would it by any chance at all be because the other side realized – rather too late in the day – that these were so many representations likely to create legal effects?

Once again, our opponents clearly have a lot of problems reconciling themselves with the facts. Everything in the case files shows that Côte d'Ivoire has, by its constant and repeated actions, created over time a representation which clearly led Ghana to adapt its own actions accordingly. This representation, you will have understood, is clearly that of a maritime boundary that follows an equidistance line and which has constantly served as a reference to the two States for the development of their activities in the area in issue. It is this representation that Ghana asserts created an obligation for Côte d'Ivoire to not brusquely depart from the position that it had maintained over the decades, at the risk of causing extremely significant prejudice to Ghana.

Is it necessary in these circumstances to speak not only of the acts but also of the silence of Côte d'Ivoire, which Côte d'Ivoire now attempts to either repudiate or minimize? Hardly – and I will only touch upon it briefly. Côte d'Ivoire's argument whereby the absence of all protests on its part over a very long period is justified by successive crises that the country underwent fails once again to be bolstered by the case file. What does the case file show? Far from being distracted by any questions linked to the exploitation of its natural offshore resources, the Ivorian authorities, quite to the contrary, throughout this whole period pursued these activities and,

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Furthermore, often did so in perfect coordination – nay, even cooperation – with their opposite numbers in Ghana.\textsuperscript{10} If the Ivorian authorities abstained from any protest with respect to these activities being carried out in the maritime areas in question by Ghana during all these years, it is not because they were unaware, nor because the political crises in the country prevented them from so doing. No, it is much simpler: because they never felt there was any reason to protest. Each State was continuing to carry out its activities on its own side of the equidistance line in accordance with the practice that it had always followed. This silence, then, is eminently revelatory, and reassured the Ghanaian authorities in their conviction that there did indeed exist an agreement between the Parties with respect to the course of their maritime boundary.

Over and beyond these factual questions, Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to estoppel is also argued on legal grounds. Our opponents try to rely on two cases in which the invocation of estoppel was dismissed by the courts seized of them. The other side refers first of all to the \textit{Gulf of Maine} case, asserting that “[t]he ICJ refused to characterize as estoppel a situation in which Canada clearly notified the United States of its boundary claims by official diplomatic channel and had started to grant oil concessions in the disputed area.”\textsuperscript{11}

This is perfectly correct but the facts in that case were very different from those that characterize the instant case. The Chamber of the Court, first of all, was of the opinion that the terms of the letter adduced by Canada as an element of acquiescence by the US could not be so taken into account because they could not be "opposed to the government of the United States" and could not be considered as "an official declaration of the United States Government on that country’s international maritime boundaries."\textsuperscript{12}

This type of obstacle is absent in the present case, where the President of Côte d’Ivoire himself adopted an official position on the question of the course of the maritime boundary, which was then followed in constant fashion by the country’s authorities.

Secondly, the Chamber of the Court also felt that it seemed “disproportionate” to wish to attribute to the silence maintained over but a few years by the American authorities in the face of Canada’s actions “legal consequences taking the concrete form of an estoppel”.\textsuperscript{13} On this point, equally, the contrast with our case is striking. Here, it is not only a question of silence but also of explicit positions, with the Ivorian authorities recognizing the line of equidistance as the joint maritime boundary. And it is certainly not a question of a short term, because Côte d’Ivoire’s behaviour continued over decades. The line of argument of the other side is in no way buttressed by this precedent.

Finally, our opponents once again try to rely on the \textit{Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago} case, where estoppel was also dismissed. They argue in this regard that the Arbitral

\textsuperscript{10} RG, para. 2.102-2.110.  
\textsuperscript{11} RCI, para. 5.39.  
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246}, para. 139.  
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 140.
Tribunal refused to accept that sporadic authorizations to conduct seismic surveys, the award of oil concessions and patrols carried out in the area in question constituted sufficient proof to establish estoppel. But, once again, two major differences between that precedent and our case must be observed. Firstly, in *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, it was solely a question of the absence of protest, whereas the estoppel invoked by Ghana is based primarily on official positions, positive acts, by the Ivorian authorities. It was these representations, repeated over time, which led Ghana to the conviction that it could rely on the existence of a common maritime boundary following an equidistance line in developing the exploration and exploitation of its offshore natural resources, and which simply illustrated the absence of challenge. That was clearly not the case in *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago*, where Barbados merely invoked the lack of protest by Trinidad and Tobago against certain actions that it had carried out in the disputed maritime areas. Secondly, in this latter case, the practice of the States concerned showed precisely that challenges had arisen with respect to the limits of their respective maritime areas. This was clearly confirmed by the arrests of Barbadian fishermen off Tobago by the authorities of Trinidad and Tobago on several occasions. These are evidently circumstances such as to diminish considerably the weight of an argument based on estoppel. It is difficult, to say the least, to infer acquiescence from certain silences maintained by a State when, at the same time, that State is carrying out actions which reflect its rejection of its neighbours' claims. But, once again, this situation has nothing in common with the instant case. There has been no procrastination on the part of Côte d'Ivoire, no silence on one side and no hostile reaction on the other. At no time before 2009 did the other Party protest against what it considered to be an encroachment by Ghana on the disputed maritime areas. At no time did it attempt to assert its authority over those areas in any way whatsoever.

Once again, it is on account of the specific circumstances of that case that the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the reliance on estoppel in the *Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago* case and, once again, our opponents are attempting to infer a general rule that the absence of protest in the face of activities such as seismic surveys or the award of oil concessions cannot form the basis for a situation of estoppel. But, of course, there is nothing to allow that step to be taken and nothing to justify the argument that estoppel be rejected in this case. Quite the contrary. I have shown you that, by the conduct it adopted and repeated over many years, Côte d'Ivoire demonstrated to Ghana, without the slightest ambiguity, that it accepted the customary equidistance line as the common maritime boundary.

In the award concerning the *Chagos Islands*, the Arbitral Tribunal set out the four conditions which, in its view, should be met in order to accept the existence of a situation of estoppel.16

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14 RCI, para. 5.39.
15 *Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between them*, decision of 11 April 2006, 17 RSA, pp. 147-251, para. 50.
Firstly, a State must have made clear and consistent representations, by word, conduct or silence. That is indeed the case here, with explicit positions being adopted by the Ivorian authorities, including in a number of official documents, and a complete absence of protest with respect to the activities carried out by Ghana in the area which is now disputed by Côte d’Ivoire, over several decades, without the slightest departure from this practice.

Secondly, such representations must be made through an agent authorized to speak for the State with respect to the matter in question. How could this condition be better met than by decrees issued by the President of the Republic or documents such as the submission made by Côte d’Ivoire to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf?

Thirdly, the State invoking estoppel must have been induced by the conduct in question to act to its detriment or to suffer a prejudice. I highlighted to you a few moments ago the scale of the prejudice which has already been caused to Ghana by the partial interruption of oil activities in the area in dispute and the considerable scale of the damages it would suffer if Côte d’Ivoire’s change of position were to be accepted.

Finally, the representation must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation for the State which relied on it. Here again, how could the Ghanaian authorities have doubted for a single moment that the constant messages they were receiving from their Ivorian neighbour, year after year, over decades, could have reflected anything other than a shared perception of the common maritime boundary? The factual and legal conditions for the application of the principle of estoppel in the present case are therefore manifestly met.

Ghana requests the Chamber to take note of this and to find that the opposing Party may not therefore suddenly change position in this regard, as it has done since 2009, without seriously infringing Ghana’s rights.

Thank you very much, Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber. Thank you for your kind attention and I request, Mr President, that you kindly give the floor to my colleague Daniel Alexander.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French): I thank Professor Klein for his presentation and I give the floor to Mr Daniel Alexander, who will be the final speaker before the coffee break at 4.30 p.m.

MR ALEXANDER: Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, it is an honour to appear before you on behalf of Ghana.

May I now turn to a different topic and address you on the allegation that there has been a breach of the Order prescribing provisional measures. Côte d’Ivoire has claimed that Ghana has violated the Order of 25 April 2015.¹ It even goes so far as

¹ See Rejoinder of Côte d’Ivoire (14 Nov. 2016) (hereinafter “RCI”), paras 6.41-6.65.
to suggest that Ghana has “disregarded” it. With respect, Côte d’Ivoire’s allegations are wholly unjustified. Ghana has complied in full with each aspect of the Order.

Ghana notified all concerned of the Order of the Special Chamber and requested compliance with it by its letter dated 4 May 2015. The letter invited operators to take appropriate steps to ensure that they complied with it and to keep adequate records of steps taken, and they have done so. I will deal with the issues referred to by Côte d’Ivoire in order: new drilling, maritime safety, preservation of information, monitoring of activities, environmental protection and cooperation.

May I address the issue of new drilling first, since Côte d’Ivoire has focused on it in its Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder. Put simply, there has been no new drilling, not just in the TEN fields area but throughout the whole region designated unilaterally by Côte d’Ivoire as the “disputed area”. The only activity that has been undertaken has been ongoing activities conducted by Ghana in respect of which drilling had already taken place.

I will deal first with interpretation of the Order and then highlight the relevant facts.

The Order provides that Ghana shall take all necessary measures to ensure that no new drilling, either by Ghana or under its control, takes place in the “disputed area”. The Order must be read as a whole. In particular, paragraphs 99 and 100 make it clear what the Special Chamber was contemplating when it used the term “no new drilling” and what was regarded as “new”. It said:

the suspension of ongoing activities conducted by Ghana in respect of which drilling has already taken place would entail the risk of considerable financial loss to Ghana and its concessionaires and could also pose a serious danger to the marine environment resulting, in particular, from the deterioration of equipment.

Similarly, in paragraph 100 the Special Chamber states that:

an order suspending all exploration or exploitation activities conducted on behalf of Ghana in the disputed area, including activities in respect of which drilling has already taken place, would therefore cause prejudice to the right claimed by Ghana and create an undue burden on it.

These paragraphs of the Order make it clear that Ghana was not required to suspend all ongoing activities in respect of which drilling had already taken place, including, specifically, exploration or exploitation activities. Other parts of the Order

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2 RCI, para. 6.41.
4 See RG, paras 5.47-5.49.
5 Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Provisional Measures, Order of 25 April 2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, p. 146 (hereinafter “Order on Provisional Measures”), para. 99.
6 Ibid., para. 100.
reinforce this. The Order acknowledges Ghana’s position that stopping all activity in the TEN field

would be “financially ruinous” and the enormous investment in the Deepwater Tano Concession Block, including the TEN ... fields, which has taken place over the last nine years (since 2006), would be threatened with irreparable harm.  

The Order is designed to prevent irreparable harm in this respect as well.  

Côte d’Ivoire chooses to play down these provisions of the Order and does not refer to them in its Counter-Memorial. Instead, it invites the Special Chamber to construe its Order in an illogical way, taking no account of its express terms and its purpose. Côte d’Ivoire’s approach is contrary to sensible principles of interpretation of a provisional measures order in international law. Its interpretation expressed in its Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder would mean that the Special Chamber had prescribed measures preventing the activities which the Order expressly permitted and which aggravated the harm that the Order was designed to avoid. That approach is, quite simply, not supportable.  

As to the facts, I will deal mainly with the TEN fields and the specific point on well NT07, upon which Côte d’Ivoire has now focused attention. May I begin, however, by reminding you of some key facts about the TEN fields and the impact of your Order generally.  

The TEN fields are among the most important discoveries of hydrocarbons in this part of the Gulf of Guinea. The region in which the TEN fields lie had been under exploration and appraisal for many years. They have been developed principally by Tullow, pursuant to agreements made over 10 years ago, which you have already seen. The TEN project represents over 28 million man hours of work, none of which, of course, has been done or paid for by Côte d’Ivoire or any of its partners.  

After these enormous investments, incurred both by Ghana and its contractors and partners over a lengthy period, the TEN fields finally started to produce oil, according to longstanding plans, in August 2016. That schedule was contemplated in the TEN Plan of Development referred to in the statements of Mr McDade, the Chief Operating Officer of Tullow, which was approved by the Government of Ghana nearly four years ago. That Plan of Development contemplated up to 24 development wells. Of those, 10 were planned to be ready for first oil in 2016.
It may assist the Special Chamber to have an aide mémoire of the TEN field’s wells planned and drilled at the date of its Order, with the dates on which they were drilled. This is displayed on your screen and at tab 2 of your Judges’ folder. It can be seen that all of the wells were planned and approved by Ghana well before this claim was commenced. There had been, until the Order, a steady and orderly implementation of the plan. This is shown in the annex to Mr McDade’s statement, which gives the dates on which these particular wells were drilled: there were two in 2009 (one post-first oil well, TG01-GP, and one not used), two in 2010 (one first oil well, NT02-GI, and one not used), five in 2011 (of which three are used for first oil), two in 2012 (one post-first oil well and one not used), three in 2013 (all of which are used for first oil), three in 2014 (all of which are used for first oil) and one in 2015 (used as a water injector for post-first oil).14

This shows a steady programme of drilling of these wells over a period of some six years. As can be seen, some of the post-first oil wells were drilled before first oil. The idea suggested by Côte d’Ivoire that there has been an artificial acceleration of drilling of a new well in 2015 to try to defeat the Special Chamber is wholly unjustified. It is unsupported by any evidence and is contrary to the evidence before you. 21

It is important also to remember the wide-ranging effect of the Order. It brought all new drilling in the TEN area to a halt, albeit permitting activities with respect to wells already drilled. However, the Order of the Special Chamber was far more extensive geographically and it has been complied with by Ghana far more extensively. There has been no new drilling, not just in the TEN fields area but throughout the whole of the region unilaterally designated by Côte d’Ivoire as the “disputed area”.15

Mr McDade’s statement gives Tullow’s perspective on the adverse impact of this in a number of respects, looking at the TEN fields alone: a cutback on drilling, the potential to have a material and negative impact on the economics and financial performance of the TEN project, excess costs, job losses and so forth.16 Ghana raised the issue of the failure of Côte d’Ivoire to undertake to compensate Ghana and others for this in the provisional measures phase17 and in the Reply.18 Where, we ask, is the undertaking from Côte d’Ivoire to compensate those affected in this way if its case is not accepted, including in respect of other parts of the disputed area where work has also been held up? We say no more about it now, but Ghana’s position is reserved. 38

May I now deal with the facts relating to well NT07, upon which Côte d’Ivoire has now focused.19

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18 See Reply, para. 5.30. See also ibid., paras 1.30, 5.4.
19 See RCI, paras 6.56-6.61.
NT07 – shown in this slide to remind you of its location – is a water injector well. It was not required for first oil but has been required shortly thereafter. A water injector assists one or more production wells in the following way. An oilfield reservoir, as you will probably know, is like a hard “sponge”. It contains hydrocarbons in porous rock. Usually it contains three layers of fluids: water at the bottom, oil in the middle and gas at the top. The pressure in such a reservoir is very high. As a result, oil will flow out of the reservoir into a production well. In some reservoirs, however, the pressure is too low or becomes too low for optimal hydrocarbon flow. That can be addressed by injecting water into the reservoir under high pressure, forcing the hydrocarbons out. Water injectors are important to ensure that there is adequate production and that the reservoir is properly maintained.

In the TEN fields, producing wells have associated water injectors. NT07 is the water injector for production well NT01. At the date of the provisional measures hearing, production well NT01 had been completely drilled. The well was not a “first oil” well but started production shortly after, in September 2016. Drilling of the water injector for NT01 began in March 2015. By the date of the Order, it had been drilled to a depth of 2,700 metres. Consistent with the requirements of the Order, which provided that it should not affect activities in respect of wells drilled prior to the Order, the well was then drilled to its final depth of 4,136 metres and completed. “Completion” of a well is a complex, multi-step, activity. It involves, among other things, the installation of production tubing, perforation of the reservoir interval, cleaning and testing the well. These activities are carried out to prepare the well for its purpose.

Côte d’Ivoire does not have anything to contradict the evidence of the Chief Operating Officer of Tullow that completing the drilling of the well to its intended depth rather than leaving it half-drilled is consistent with good oilfield practice. A well left half drilled, just like a building left half built, can lead to problems. It can result in an unstable well-bore, a risk of corrosion and damage its usability, necessitating additional monitoring.

These facts were set out in Ghana’s Reply of July 2016. They are confirmed and recorded in detail in the documents that Côte d’Ivoire requested and which were provided in October last year. So far from showing that there has been a violation of the Order, the documents confirm that there has not been. They show that there has only been work undertaken on wells already drilled in accordance with the terms of the Order.

In summary, contrary to Côte d’Ivoire’s position, since the Order, Tullow has only conducted activities permitted by it. If Côte d’Ivoire truly believed that Ghana was in
violation of this part of the Order, it could have come back to this Chamber. It has not done so, and that speaks loudly.

On this issue, may I also deal briefly with the records provided by Ghana in October 2016? As the Special Chamber will know, a large number of different activities are conducted by equipment generally known as drilling rigs. Oil production is not a question of simply drilling a hole and waiting for the oil to come out. A well has to be cased with a steel and concrete liner to ensure that it is stable and then it has to be completed in the way that I have described. The necessary pipework and connectors have to be installed and many other complex operations conducted. These operations are conducted from a moveable platform, described as a drilling rig, which performs a large range of functions that are recorded in documents often generically described as drilling records. Often they are records of activities with respect to a well that are specifically not drilling, and you can see that in the records provided here. I will not go through them this afternoon because the Special Chamber can easily read the useful summaries of activity in each of the records to confirm this, should it be interested to do so.

Côte d’Ivoire tries to present a misleading picture of what the records show by not referring the Special Chamber to the actual contents of them. The records themselves show that there has not been any drilling of the formation, with the exception of the extension of the NT07-WI water injector, which was already in hand at the time of the Order in the way that I have described to you. Côte d’Ivoire compounds its error by trying to characterize as “drilling” a range of rig activities that do not involve drilling of any kind. It goes so far as to suggest that activities such as well completion and de-completion in which a rig was used violate the prohibition against new drilling. This is a further indication of the unreal approach that it takes to this issue. It is the kind of exploitation activity with respect to already drilled wells that the Order permitted and was not to be regarded as new drilling. There is, with all respect to Côte d’Ivoire, no substance whatever in its arguments on this issue.

Finally, I turn to deal briefly with the other issues. Côte d’Ivoire’s position seems somewhat confused in that it refers to some of them but actually does not appear to allege breach of the Order.

First, as to maritime safety, Côte d’Ivoire does not appear to allege breach. Ghana issued maritime warnings and imposed restrictions on maritime traffic around the TEN fields. Those were appropriate safety measures to protect other maritime

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29 See Letter from Agent of Ghana to Registrar, ITLOS (16 Sept. 2016), p. 3.
31 See G0001 to G0096, G0161 to G0168, G0297, G0463, G0460, G0550, G0709, G1036, G1116 to G1143, G1411, G1440, G1518 to G1528, G1645, G1690 to G1705, G2079, G2118, G2286 to G2289, G2297, G2304 to G2313, G2321 to G2490.
32 See G0001 to G0096.
33 See CMCI, paras 9.65-9.66.
users, as well as the marine environment and the relevant equipment, from damage caused by a collision or unduly close approach of vessels to a rig.  

Next, on preservation of information, Ghana has complied with the aspect of the Order requiring preservation of information. Again, it does not appear to be suggested otherwise.

As to monitoring of activities in the disputed area, again Côte d’Ivoire does not appear to suggest breach, so may I just bring you up to date on this and remind you of the relevant provisions of Ghanaian law. In summary, Ghana has exercised full control over the activities of those undertakings active in the area. It retains in place and applies the stringent environmental and regulatory framework for oil activities. This was described in detail in the submissions for the provisional measures hearing.

As regards environmental monitoring, the Special Chamber can see from the minutes of the joint meetings that there was a full discussion of the issues concerning environmental protection. Points in dispute were referred to the Agents for decision, although in the event they did not meet and Côte d’Ivoire did not

35 See RG, paras 5.55.
36 Order on Provisional Measures, para. 108(1)(b). The Order provides that Ghana should take all necessary steps to prevent information resulting from past, ongoing or future exploration activities conducted by Ghana, or with its authorization, in the disputed area that is not already in the public domain from being used in any way whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire.
37 Ibid., paras 108(1)(b)-(c). The Order provides that Ghana should carry out strict and continuous monitoring of all activities undertaken by Ghana or with its authorization in the disputed area with a view to ensuring the prevention of serious harm to the marine environment and that the parties should take all necessary steps to prevent serious harm to the marine environment.
pursue the matter further. Ghana was to provide environmental reports in advance of meetings to be fixed to discuss any issues. In January 2016, Ghana provided Côte d'Ivoire with a report that provides an account of the environmental issues to the end of 2015.\(^{40}\) It shows that there were no adverse environmental issues. No meeting was arranged then or since, and therefore no further report has been provided. Côte d'Ivoire has not followed this up. However, Ghana has, of course, continued to engage in environmental monitoring. No one has suggested that there have been any adverse environmental events or issues which require further discussion.

Finally, as regards cooperation and provision of information,\(^{41}\) Ghana has again been entirely cooperative. Where reasonable requests were made, it has agreed to them, as the record of communications and meetings shows. The questions raised in Côte d'Ivoire’s letter of July 2015\(^{42}\) were addressed at meetings attended by the Agents of both Parties and numerous specialist representatives in September and October 2015\(^{43}\) and in the work undertaken subsequent to those meetings. As can be seen from the records, issues reasonably raised by Côte d'Ivoire were properly addressed or were not followed up once responded to by Ghana.

However, Côte d'Ivoire requested far more information than is reasonable or necessary. Ghana was right not to agree to Côte d'Ivoire’s more extreme requests, which included requests for daily reports of activities in the “disputed area” and to have their own representatives present during all of Ghana’s well operations.\(^{44}\) None of this was even sought in the provisional measures request. It was not ordered by the Special Chamber, and it is manifestly disproportionate and unnecessary.

In conclusion, with respect, I say that it is regrettable that Côte d'Ivoire has sought to question Ghana’s good faith compliance with the Order. Ghana has complied in full, and we therefore respectfully invite the Special Chamber to reject Côte d'Ivoire’s submissions on this issue.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, I thank you for your attention and ask whether you would like to take a break or give the floor to Ms Macdonald for the concluding presentation of the day.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French):
Thank you, Mr Alexander. It is 4.30 and we will now take a break of 30 minutes and resume at 5 p.m. to continue to hear the final speaker of Ghana for today.


\(^{41}\) See RCI, paras 6.63-6.65.


THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French): The hearing will now resume. I will now give the floor to Ms Macdonald. Ms Macdonald, you have the floor.

MS MACDONALD: Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, it is a privilege for me to appear before you today on behalf of Ghana, last but I hope not least. Mr Alexander has just addressed Ghana’s compliance with the Order for Provisional Measures, and my task is to deal with the other respects in which Côte d’Ivoire says that Ghana has violated international law.¹

Côte d’Ivoire argues that Ghana’s activities have violated Côte d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights and, further, that Ghana has breached article 83 of the Convention.

Before I turn to the legal principles which apply here, it is important to remind ourselves of the factual background. At the heart of Côte d’Ivoire’s allegations is their repeated attempt to characterize Ghana’s activities as “unilateral”.² This is crucial to their legal argument, for the simple reason that it is very difficult for a State to say that its rights have been violated by things which another State has done with its consent.

However, as you have heard in Ghana’s presentations on the facts, it is impossible to apply the term “unilateral” to Ghana’s activities in this area. As my colleagues have demonstrated, Ghana’s activities have been conducted openly and with Côte d’Ivoire’s cooperation, on the basis of, until recently, a common understanding of the location of the customary equidistance boundary.

Ghana did not undertake these activities in order to claim this territory; rather, it undertook them because of the two States’ shared understanding that the territory belonged to Ghana.

This factual background is essential when one turns to consider the legal obligations which Côte d’Ivoire says that Ghana has breached. I will deal first with the issue of sovereign rights, before turning to article 83 of the Convention.

On the question of sovereign rights, Côte d’Ivoire claims that there is a rule against activities in a disputed area pending final delimitation.³ It is rather unclear whether Côte d’Ivoire is relying on an alleged rule against activities in a disputed area per se – in other words, regardless of which State is ultimately held to possess that area – or whether this argument relates only to any part of the area which is eventually held to form part of the territory of Côte d’Ivoire. The first argument or possibility overlaps entirely with Côte d’Ivoire’s case on article 83. Therefore, I will deal with it in that context and for now will concentrate on the second option, namely the proposition that, if Ghana has undertaken so-called unilateral activities in any area, however small, which is ultimately awarded to Côte d’Ivoire, then the Special Chamber should not be content with declaring the location

² See for example, CMCI, paras 5.27; 9.3; 9.40; 9.42; 9.65.
³ Ibid., para. 9.15.
of the maritime boundary, but should go on to hold that Ghana has violated international law by the activities that it conducted in that area before the Tribunal’s eventual award.

There is a simple answer to this argument, namely that, given the agreement of the Parties on the location of the maritime boundary, established through half a century of consistent mutual practice, Ghana has only ever been operating on its own territory. If you accept that the boundary lies where Ghana says it does, for the compelling reasons that my colleagues have outlined, then this part of Côte d’Ivoire’s argument simply does not arise and there can be no question of any violation of Côte d’Ivoire’s sovereign rights.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Côte d’Ivoire’s rights were engaged, there is another fundamental answer to their points, namely that none of Ghana’s activities in the relevant area have, in fact, been unilateral, for the reasons which others before me have outlined. So even if there were, as Côte d’Ivoire alleges, a rule against unilateral activity in a disputed area, that is not the sort of activity that we are dealing with here.

This is a very important point when we look at the sovereign rights argument, because it can hardly be said that State A violates State B’s sovereign rights by undertaking activities in a maritime area which both States treated as belonging to State A, even if some of the area is later awarded to State B. To put it in more domestic terms, Mr President, if I accompany someone into a house which we both treat for many years as theirs and by some strange turn of events the house later turns out to belong to me, I cannot suddenly accuse my companion of trespass.

However, this is how Côte d’Ivoire asks you to interpret the law. It asks you to make serious findings against Ghana in respect of peaceful economic activities that Ghana has carried out with Côte d’Ivoire’s full knowledge in a process stretching back for decades. Côte d’Ivoire asks you to find that articles 77, 81 and 193 of UNCLOS are automatically violated by this sort of activity in any area that eventually turns out to belong to another State. If we step back for a moment, if this were correct, then one would expect to see international courts finding violations in every boundary case in which any activities have been undertaken in the supposedly disputed area; and yet no court or tribunal has ever done so.

One has to think about the practical implications of Côte d’Ivoire’s argument. If it is right, it means that the mere advancement of a claim by one State against its neighbour, however unjustified or even unarguable, would oblige the neighbour to cease all activities in the supposedly disputed territory until the claim had been resolved.

This would have radical consequences. A State could acquiesce in its neighbour’s economic activity and then, later on when that activity looked rather profitable, effectively hold its neighbour hostage, causing grave economic damage by suddenly throwing the area of production into dispute by a claim, however spurious, to some of its neighbour’s maritime territory. In this case, it would have been incredibly difficult

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4 CMCI, paras 9.3-9.25.
for Ghana to work out where, in Côte d’Ivoire’s opinion, it was not allowed to work, as the no-go area which Côte d’Ivoire claims has shifted around so much over the years. Here on the screen we can see the customary equidistance boundary and, to the east, the various boundaries which Côte d’Ivoire proposed between 2009 and 2014. Was Ghana really expected to shift its oil production around every time Côte d’Ivoire shifted its line? So in 2009 it would have had to down tools in this area; in 2010 in this area; in 2011 in this area; and, from 2014 onwards, in this area. We say that a nation’s oil industry cannot be expected to shift around in this arbitrary fashion.

When one thinks through the consequences of Côte d’Ivoire’s argument, it is not surprising, we say, that this is a path which no previous Tribunal has wished to tread. Côte d’Ivoire’s argument, if it were correct, would allow States to act utterly inconsistently with their claimed sovereign rights and then belatedly assert them, with severe financial consequences. It would encourage them to overreach in their claims, exactly as Côte d’Ivoire has done. Perversely, it would penalize States that act reasonably and with restraint. It would actively encourage unjustified claims.

Côte d’Ivoire, in support of this ambitious argument, relies heavily on the case of Guyana v. Suriname. However, this decision does not help them, either on their sovereign rights argument or on article 83. On the sovereign rights argument, the Special Chamber will bear in mind that Suriname was advancing the extreme proposition that no claim for reparation can be advanced in respect of the use or threat of force in territory which is the subject of a boundary dispute. Not surprisingly, the Tribunal declined to, in its words, “create a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of international law.” There the Tribunal was purely concerned to ensure that the rules on the use of force were not somehow disapplied to a territory simply because it is the subject of a boundary dispute. Such a situation is, of course, very different from the long-standing and peaceful economic activity that we have in Ghana’s case.

When one goes on to think about the result in Guyana v. Suriname, the case actually offers powerful support for Ghana’s position. Although the Tribunal declared Guyana’s claims relating to the use of force admissible, it went on to decide that there was no need to rule on whether Suriname’s responsibility was actually engaged, or to award Guyana any compensation.

In reaching this decision, the Tribunal relied on, we say, a highly relevant passage from the ICJ’s decision in Cameroon v. Nigeria. There, the Court held that:

By the very fact of the present Judgment and of the evacuation of the Cameroonian territory occupied by Nigeria, the injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the occupation of its territory will in all events have been sufficiently addressed. The Court will not therefore seek to ascertain whether

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8 Guyana v. Suriname, Award, paras 423-4, 450.
9 Ibid., para. 450.
and to what extent Nigeria's responsibility to Cameroon has been engaged as a result of that occupation.\footnote{Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303, para. 319.}

The Court reached that conclusion despite the fact that, in light of the land boundary fixed by the Court, Nigerian armed forces were stationed on territory belonging to Cameroon. If Côte d'Ivoire's approach is correct, then it is hard to fathom why the Court did not go on to rule that there had been a serious violation of Cameroon's sovereign rights. But, as we have set out in our written pleadings,\footnote{Reply of Ghana (25 July 2016) (hereinafter "RG"), paras 5.10-5.18.} the case law on this point is quite consistent – the fixing of a boundary, land or maritime, is a sufficient remedy. There is no need to, it is not fair to, punish a State for conduct which it undertook when it genuinely believed that it had sovereign rights over particular territory. The ICJ, and Annex VII tribunals, have not treated maritime boundary awards as rendering the Parties liable for activities in the area when it was disputed, and the Special Chamber should not, we say, be the first to take this serious step, one that would have grave and far-reaching consequences.

Côte d'Ivoire goes on to claim various remedies for the alleged breach of its sovereign rights. For the reasons I have just explained, there is no basis for the Special Chamber to hold Ghana to be in violation of international law, so the question of remedies does not arise. But for the sake of completeness, Ghana has addressed Côte d'Ivoire's claimed remedies in its written submissions,\footnote{Ibid., paras 5.22-5.30.} and I will also do so briefly at this point in my submissions.

Côte d'Ivoire makes two claims: firstly, a claim for \textit{restitutio in integrum} by way of an order requiring Ghana to hand over information relating to economic activity in the relevant area\footnote{CMCI, paras 9.27-9.32.} and, secondly, a claim for financial compensation.\footnote{Ibid., paras 9.33-9.39.}

Looking first at the claim to information, Ghana has drawn attention, both at the provisional measures stage and in the Reply, to Côte d'Ivoire's failure to cite any legal authority for its claimed right to information – let alone a right to the sort of commercially sensitive information which we are dealing with here.\footnote{RG, paras 5.23-5.24.} The cases which it cites are not on point, and there is, we say, simply no legal basis for the Special Chamber to order Ghana to provide the very extensive list of information which Côte d'Ivoire now seeks.

The lack of any legal basis for this request is reason enough for the Special Chamber to refuse it; but even if Côte d'Ivoire could establish the existence of this novel right, there are further barriers, we say, to making the order it seeks.

For one thing, it is remarkable that Côte d'Ivoire only asked for this information for the first time in its application for provisional measures. The activities in question are longstanding, and one would expect that if Côte d'Ivoire genuinely needed, and thought it was entitled to, such information it might have asked for it sooner.
Here, of course, I should make clear that, as Ghana assured the Special Chamber at the provisional measures hearing, it is carefully recording a range of information about activities in the relevant area – as it would have done in any event as a responsible State. But this does not mean that Ghana should be ordered to hand this material over – far from it. This is commercially sensitive material which Ghana and its operators have spent considerable time, effort and money on gathering – from territory legitimately believed to belong to Ghana, with the knowledge and consent of Côte d'Ivoire. This information is protected by international and domestic laws, including intellectual property laws, in the hands of those responsible technically and commercially for generating it. It is not simply a matter of ordering Ghana to hand it over, and the Special Chamber, we submit, should simply refuse this over-broad and legally unfounded request. It would provide Côte d'Ivoire with an unmerited windfall for which it would not have paid.

Moving from there to the question of compensation, it is not entirely clear whether Côte d'Ivoire claims compensation purely for the loss of oil revenues from any part of the disputed area which the Special Chamber's judgment may award to it, or whether it also claims compensation above and beyond that. Ghana submits that there is no basis for the second option. It would be absurd to compensate Côte d'Ivoire, for example, for physical changes to the seabed brought about by oil production works which Côte d'Ivoire itself wants to pursue in the very same way, in the very same area, and which it has done on its side of the customary boundary. The only financial loss which could realistically be said to have occurred if the Special Chamber departed from the customary equidistance boundary, and depending on what the Chamber were to order in its place, is the loss of oil revenue from any area awarded to Côte d'Ivoire; and in respect of those revenues Ghana would, of course, honour the commitments which it made to the Special Chamber at the provisional measures hearing. The basis and terms of compensation, if any were appropriate, would themselves be complex issues and, as Mr Alexander has mentioned, would also require consideration of losses caused to Ghana by its compliance with the Special Chamber's Order for Provisional Measures. The parties agree that these issues would have to be dealt with later on, if they arise at all, following the Special Chamber's award.

I turn now, finally, to the question of article 83 of the Convention. Côte d'Ivoire claims that this article means that unilateral economic activities are prohibited in a zone under litigation.

There is a fundamental difference between the Parties on this point. As before, the first answer to this is that Ghana’s activities cannot meaningfully be described as unilateral, but leaving aside that basic answer to Côte d'Ivoire’s argument, and as Ghana has set out in detail in the Reply, there is no basis at all for the claim that article 83 requires a complete moratorium on economic activity in an area in dispute. Such a moratorium was proposed during the negotiation of the Convention, received very little support, and the proposals were abandoned. The travaux show that the

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16 As recorded in the Order of the Special Chamber, 25 April 2015, para. 92.
18 Ibid., para. 9.45.
19 RG, para. 5.37.
framers of the Convention were concerned to ensure that it did not interfere with
economic development in areas under dispute, and understandably so: otherwise a
State could, for example, shut down its neighbour’s activity by abruptly stating that it
no longer agreed with a long-observed maritime boundary – just as Côte d’Ivoire
seeks to do in this case.

So the travaux do not support Côte d’Ivoire’s case on article 83, and nor does the
leading decision on that article in Guyana v. Suriname. The Tribunal in that case
considered that article 83 “constitutes an implicit acknowledgment of the importance
of avoiding the suspension of economic development in a disputed maritime area, as
long as such activities do not affect the reaching of a final agreement.”

The touchstone is whether any particular activity jeopardizes or hampers the
reaching of a final agreement. The Tribunal drew a rough-and-ready distinction
between acts which cause a physical change to the marine environment and those
which do not, considering that acts which cause a physical change “may jeopardize
or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement as a result of the perceived
change to the status quo that they would engender.”

Ghana draws particular attention to the reference to the status quo. This is a highly
fact-specific test: the Tribunal wisely refrained from doing anything so mechanical as
to draw up a checklist of prohibited and permitted activities in a disputed area. It
could not have done so, of course, because article 83 clearly and deliberately
refrains from doing so – the question is always what disturbs the status quo and
hampers the reaching of agreement. The list of State practice cited by Côte d’Ivoire is therefore of no assistance at all – what different States choose to do in different
circumstances cannot help us here, and in any event there is nothing to say that any
restraint demonstrated by those States in their particular circumstances was based
on what they considered to be their obligations under article 83. In this case, rather
than changing the status quo, Ghana’s activities in the relevant area are the status
quo. We say that in those circumstances it is impossible to see how they jeopardize
or hamper the reaching of a final agreement.

Côte d’Ivoire also seems to argue that Ghana has failed, as article 83 also requires,
to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. This is,
especially, an allegation of failure to cooperate and to comply with Côte d’Ivoire’s
requests for information, and the only example given in the Counter-Memorial
dates back to a meeting on 2 November 2011, the fifth meeting between the Parties
on the maritime boundary.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, we simply invite you to read the
minutes of that meeting in full. This was the meeting at which Côte d’Ivoire
announced its switch from a meridian to a bisector approach. This was the first time
that Côte d’Ivoire had ever even mentioned the bisector. It was coupled with a

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20 See the analysis at RG, para. 5.37.
21 Guyana v. Suriname, Award, para. 4.60.
22 Ibid., para. 4.80.
23 CMCI paras 9.46-9.48; RCI, para. 5.22.
24 CMCI, para. 9.55.
blanket demand for Ghana to suspend all economic activity in the area newly thrown into dispute, and it came a month after Côte d’Ivoire had written to Ghana’s operators, out of the blue, demanding that they halt all operations in activities in an area that Côte d’Ivoire marked out on a map, covering waters hitherto recognized by all as belonging to Ghana. If either State has jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final agreement, it is Côte d’Ivoire, we sadly suggest, by behaving in this fashion.

In the circumstances, Ghana’s careful response at the meeting, and the thoughtful and considered proposals produced later on by the Boundary Commission, reflect extremely well on a State which was, essentially, being held to ransom by the abrupt decision of its neighbour to depart from the long-established maritime boundary. The record shows, we submit, that Ghana has acted throughout in a constructive spirit, in good faith and as a good neighbour.

In the Rejoinder, Côte d’Ivoire also complains that Ghana did not respond to a very extensive request for technical information relating to the drilling schedule in the TEN area. Ghana did, of course, comply promptly when the Special Chamber asked it to provide this voluminous material – and, as the Special Chamber will have seen, the material takes matters no further forward. Precisely all that Côte d’Ivoire has been able to find is confirmation of the fact that well Nt-07 was, as Mr Alexander has explained, drilled out to its final depth following the Provisional Measures Order – a matter which Ghana was entirely clear about in its Reply and which, as Mr Alexander has explained, is fully compliant with the Special Chamber’s Order. The Chamber will judge for itself whether any of these matters could possibly constitute non-cooperation.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, by way of very brief conclusion, there is, we suggest, no basis for any finding that Ghana has violated either general international law, the Convention, or your Provisional Measures Order. At all times, Ghana has acted responsibly, with restraint, and with respect for both the letter and the spirit of the law. And, really, the allegations which Mr Alexander and I have dealt with in our speeches are a distraction from your task. That task, as others before me have explained, is to indicate the precise coordinates of the customary equidistance boundary which has long been observed by the two States, or alternatively to apply equidistance methodology, which in this case reaches the same equitable result in the same long-established location.

Mr President, Members of the Special Chamber, with that, it is my privilege to conclude Ghana’s first round of submissions. Thank you for your attention and I ask you to draw today’s proceedings to a close.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL CHAMBER (Interpretation from French):

Thank you, Ms Macdonald. Your presentation brings to an end the first round of Ghana’s submissions. Tomorrow, on Wednesday 8th, the Special Chamber is not scheduled to sit. We will meet for the beginning of the first round of Côte d’Ivoire’s submissions on Thursday from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

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26 Ibid., Annex 54.
27 RCI, paras 6.63-6.65.
28 RG, para. 5.52.
Have a pleasant evening.

(The sitting closed at 5.30 p.m.)