# INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA



## 2012

# Public sitting held on Friday, 30 November 2012, at 12 noon, at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg, President Shunji Yanai presiding

THE "ARA LIBERTAD" CASE

(Argentina v. Ghana)

Verbatim Record

Present: President Shunji Yanai

Vice-President Albert J. Hoffmann

Judges P. Chandrasekhara Rao

Joseph Akl

Rüdiger Wolfrum

Tafsir Malick Ndiaye

José Luís Jesus

Jean-Pierre Cot

Anthony Amos Lucky

Stanislaw Pawlak

Helmut Tuerk

James L. Kateka

Zhiguo Gao

Boualem Bouguetaia

Vladimir Golitsyn

Jin-Hyun Paik

Elsa Kelly

**David Attard** 

Markiyan Kulyk

Judge ad hoc Thomas A. Mensah

Registrar Philippe Gautier

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as Agent;

Mr Horacio Adolfo Basabe, Head, Direction of International Legal Assistance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship,

as Co-Agent;

and

Mr Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland,

Mr Gerhard Hafner. Professor of International Law.

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Mr Paul Aryene, Ambassador of the Republic of Ghana to Germany, Embassy of Ghana, Berlin, Germany,

Mr Peter Owusu Manu, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Ghana, Berlin, Germany.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The Tribunal will continue the hearing in the "ARA Libertad" Case. We will now hear the second round of oral arguments presented by Ghana. I give the floor to Mr Sands.

MR SANDS: Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, we shall be very brief in our second round. We do not want to repeat what is set out in our Written Statement or what we said yesterday. It is very clear to us that the Members of the Tribunal are fully on top of this dossier. Therefore, instead we will limit ourselves to responding to the points raised this morning. That is necessarily meant, and we apologize to the interpreters that we are not in a position to give them a written text in advance, but we thought that it would be more useful to home in on the most important points. I, of course, make the general reservation that we maintain the totality of our arguments and home in on these points because we think that they are usefully addressed at this stage.

I will make six points in relation to what Argentina had to say this morning, and then I will invite you to ask the distinguished Agent of Ghana to come to the bar to conclude Ghana's submissions for this stage of the proceedings.

I should say that we were pretty surprised about what Argentina did not address this morning, and we thought that that was rather telling. It was quite selective in its choice of articles of the Convention, although we appreciate that they have now seen fit to go into some of the detail. They did not, for example, say anything about article 2, paragraph 3, of the Convention, which we had raised yesterday – and I will say more about that in due course; they did not say anything about the bond or its waiver of immunity. They seem to be saying to you that you can ignore that bond completely and can ignore completely the terms of their waiver of immunity, whatever it may mean, including waiver of immunity in relation to enforcement. We say that that is a surprising position to adopt in these proceedings.

Let me deal with the first point, which is very brief, that is on the facts that led up to the arrest and impounding of the vessel. The point that I want to make here is a simple one. We were criticized very gently and generously by Professor Hafner for somehow suggesting that the judgments in the United States and the United Kingdom, to which we took you, were of significance or that they related to the vessel. Of course, we were very careful in what we said. We did not say that those judgments were about the vessel; we said that they were about the bond and the waiver of immunity, including in relation to enforcement, and that is a significant distinction.

 However, for the avoidance of doubt, we want to be clear that we took you to those cases because we do not think that you can understand the facts without having the totality of the context, and those cases, unhappy as they may be for Argentina, are a significant part of that context; they are not judgments that are immaterial to these proceedings, as Mr Hafner said this morning. We therefore rely on these cases not to express any view on their substantive content or their merits but simply to explain how the circumstances in which the events that have brought us here for the past couple of days have happened.

 In relation to those judgments, if we understood him correctly, Professor Hafner said that the proper place in which to raise those issues is before the courts of Ghana. Of course, we agree with that; that is exactly where those issues ought to be raised, and towards the end of my presentation I will come back to talk about the role of the courts of Ghana and their relationship to these proceedings.

Let me turn to our second point in relation to *prima facie* jurisdiction. We are pleased that Argentina has finally decided to engage with this issue and has seen fit to descend into the details of the four provisions on which they rely in support of their claim. I have to say that overnight we have had an opportunity to read the transcript of yesterday's proceedings, to look at all the authorities cited and to note what authorities Argentina has and has not referred to. I mentioned yesterday that it was rather striking that Argentina had almost nothing to say about the four provisions of the Convention on which they purport to rely. Re-reading the transcript this morning for a second time, it is equally striking how little they had to say about your jurisprudence on all these matters. It is as though, rather like the waiver of immunity and the bond itself, they would like to wish away this Tribunal's jurisprudence on these matters.

By way of an aside, I should say from experience as sitting as an arbitrator that I find it incredibly helpful when counsel address submissions on the authorities that are most unhelpful, because often judges faced with an authority that is on the point but unhelpful want an explanation of why it is distinguishable or should not be followed on the facts of a particular case. That is not a criticism; it is simply a different style of advocacy. We are in a fortunate position on the side of Ghana that there really are no authorities unhelpful to our case. We are able to rely very fully on the authorities.

There is one recent authority that is very unhelpful to Argentina, and they made no effort to address it yesterday, nor did they mention it today, and we think that that absence is rather revealing. It is, of course, the case of the *Louisa*, which recently came before the Tribunal and with which many of you will be far more familiar than I, between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Spain. I re-read it at about 3 o'clock in the morning together with the separate and dissenting opinions, so I am a little more familiar with it than I was yesterday, though I had of course read it before. It is an instructive and rather helpful decision. Reading the separate and dissenting opinions helped me to re-frame the question of *prima facie* jurisdiction, which is addressed quite fully by some of the judges, in a slightly different way.

Argentina has asserted that four provisions of the Convention have been violated because of Ghana's treatment of the *Libertad* in the internal waters of Ghana. Another way of putting the issue, perhaps in the form of a question, is: are any of the four articles of the Convention that have been invoked by Argentina, that is articles 18, 32, 87 and 90, relevant to the exercise by Ghana of its sovereign rights over activities conducted in its internal waters? In a sense, that is the nub of the issue.

We need only raise that question to come immediately to the answer, which is obviously negative. On their face – we need not go any further – none of those provisions is applicable to acts occurring in internal waters. On their face, none has anything to say about any issue of immunity or waiver or immunity in internal waters.

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Therefore, *prima facie* on the face of these provisions themselves, the Annex VII tribunal does not have jurisdiction and you are not able to prescribe any provisional measures under article 290, paragraph 5. We say that you do not need to go beyond the face of these four provisions to conclude that sovereign acts occurring in internal waters do not engage these provisions.

This morning Professor Hafner put one of those provisions, article 32, up on your screen, but I fear that it did not help his cause. He did not put up articles 18, 87 or 90. It is very clear – I read it on the screen, as you will have read it on your screens this morning – that nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. The provision does not set forth an obligation establishing a rule of immunity. It is a saver clause. It merely makes clear that the Convention's provisions in the territorial sea will have no impact on immunity rules, but it is only in relation to the territorial sea. Indeed, nothing in the Convention deals with the status of ships in port.

We referred you to the writings of Professors Churchill and Lowe, and this morning counsel for Argentina said absolutely nothing to rebut the review of those two distinguished authorities, and there is nothing to rebut them, because they are right and because the Convention simply does not regulate these matters.

We have not, and do not need to at this limited phase of the proceedings, burdened you with the history of the agreement that the 1982 Convention would not regulate the status of vessels in internal waters, but I will now refer you very briefly to the relevant little story of how that happened.

 If you go backwards in time from the 1982 Convention to the Conference on the Law of the Sea, to the 1958 Convention, back through the work of the International Law Commission, then back to the Preparatory Committee for the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law and trace the work on the territorial waters, you will see that that is the starting point, and in that context the Hague Preparatory Committee asked States whether the subject of jurisdiction over foreign ships in ports should be included as a subject at the conference. The decision taken was not to include any clause on that subject in the proposed convention, and that set the scene for everything that followed.

That work, five or so decades before the 1982 Convention, informed the subsequent work of the International Law Commission, the negotiations that led to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and the later negotiations and the text that became the 1982 Convention. At each stage it was understood that the regime of ports and internal waters was excluded from the relevant instrument and from the 1982 Convention, on the basis, as one member of the International Law Commission put it in 1954, that it was "universally agreed" that the regime of ports and internal waters was "different from that of the territorial sea".

The 1982 convention contains no rule on the status of foreign vessels in internal waters and ports, on immunity in internal waters and ports or on the waiver of immunity in internal waters and ports of a kind that can be relied upon in these proceedings by Argentina. It is as simple as that. Argentina has provided you with

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absolutely nothing that contradicts that position, and they have had quite a few weeks to prepare for this phase of the proceedings, unlike our side.

What they did do is to ignore a provision that we think is rather relevant. They had nothing to say about article 2, paragraph 3. Let us have a look at that in a little more detail. The title is "Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil". Paragraph 1: "The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."

Then we go to paragraph 3: "The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law."

Argentina wants you to re-write paragraph 3. It wants you to say "the sovereignty over internal waters and the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law"; but of course it does not say that, and the fact that it does not say that is absolutely dispositive of this case. It is plain the drafters of the Convention did not intend to regulate sovereign acts in internal waters by reference to the Convention or other rules of international law. If they had wanted to. they would have done that. So no reference is made to that, and we think that that is really very telling. Instead we did get references to new provisions that have never before been mentioned in these proceedings, for example reference to article 25. I have to say that we had to watch it as we were being addressed this morning. I put it up on my screen and I saw that article 25 says "rights of protection of the coastal State" and paragraph 1 says that the coastal State may take the necessary steps "in its territorial sea" to prevent passage that is not innocent. "In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal waters, the coastal State" has certain rights. It is just crystal clear from the text, that it has absolutely nothing to do with the regulation of matters in internal waters.

Another provision that was thrown at us today for the first time was article 36. What does that say? It is in Part XII of the Convention. It is limited to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, which is not in issue in this case. It basically says that all the provisions of the Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to warships and certain other ships. There you have a clear rule that extends to certain waters under article 218 that are governed, but it is not a general rule. It is plainly not a general rule and it can provide no assistance in circumstances of a case that has nothing to do with the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

Another provision that was mentioned newly this morning was article 8. What does that say? Well, finally we have a provision that does use the words "internal waters". Again, look at the text of the Convention to see what it says. Paragraph 1 says:

Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State.

2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters.

 It becomes absolutely clear when you read that text that innocent passage is not intended to be available in the internal waters which were previously considered as such; so I think one has to be rigorous in going through these provisions. We simply cannot see why these provisions have been thrown at you as part of a general, almost desperate effort, to find any basis on which to hang an immunity case in relation to matters in internal waters. It is what one might call a "multiple bootstraps" argument to concoct an immunity rule in UNCLOS applicable in internal waters where, plainly, none exists. In regard to those kinds of efforts we commend in particular, but not only, some of the separate and dissenting opinions and the opinion of the majority in the *Louisa* case, for example paragraph 22 of Judge Wolfrum's opinion and the totality of Judge Golitsyn's opinion on how one ought to be addressing these kinds of matters.

I come to my third point. Again, it is a brief one. Argentina is constantly taking you to rules of international law arising outside of the Convention. We were presented with a lengthy and excellent discourse vesterday by Professor Hafner on the law of State immunity and a little bit on waivers of immunity. We listened attentively and with great interest; but you will have seen that virtually the totality of that presentation was to do with rules that arise and exist outside of the Convention. They have done it again today. Today we were presented with an argument, bootstraps of sort, related to innocent passage, but the gist of the argument was that there had been an exchange of letters between Argentina and Ghana and that this somehow implicated a violation of Ghana's obligation to present Argentina with a right of innocent passage: it does absolutely nothing of the sort. Firstly, we do not accept that there is an agreement that has been violated. Even assuming that there had been an agreement in the exchange of letters, if anything has been violated it is the agreement in that exchange of letters, not anything else – not the Convention on the Law of the Sea. You cannot have two States enter into an agreement in that way and then argue, "it is not the agreement that has been violated but some other international agreement that is in some way connected, so we can bootstrap ourselves into a tribunal that doesn't have jurisdiction" in relation to a dispute concerning exchanges of letters.

The fourth point that we make is in relation to the place of the merits on all of these issues: Mr Kohen said this morning, if I understood him correctly, that by addressing the merits of the four provisions on which Argentina rests its case for jurisdiction, we have sort of stumbled into confirming that there is an arguable or plausible case. It is plain that we have not done that. We read with interest paragraph 12 of Judge Wolfrum's opinion in the *M/V "Louisa" Case* which I think summarizes the position rather clearly in a really, I would have thought, non-contentious sort of way.

On the basis of the jurisprudence of the ICJ it may be summarized that – for an international court or tribunal to assume *prima facie* jurisdiction – it is not sufficient that an applicant merely invokes provisions which, read in an abstract way, may provide theoretically a basis for the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal in question. On the contrary, it is necessary for the adjudicative body to take into account the facts...

which we have done

...which are known to it at the moment of deciding on provisional measures and to consider whether on this basis, together with legal basis invoked by the applicant, *prima facie* jurisdiction on the merits may be established. Such considerations cannot be left to the merits phase.

With great respect to all members of the Bench, we think that is the right approach. You cannot just keel over the moment a Party invokes certain provisions which, as we have explained to you, on their face have nothing to do with the subject matter that has arisen in these proceedings.

 Let me turn to the fifth point, which is more on the factual side, and move on to the question of irreparable harm and urgency. We do not have very much to add to what was said yesterday. The facts on the ground, frankly, are rather clear and there is not much of a difference between the two Parties as to the present situation. There is no denial on the part of Argentina that the crew is anything other than completely free to come and go as they wish, and there really is not any claim that anything untoward has happened except on 7 November. We have explained what happened in those circumstances, and we read with great interest the affidavits that have come in today which are, frankly, completely consistent with the account that we have given.

 We read that the gravamen of the distinguished Argentinian Ambassador in Ghana's affidavit is that she was delayed for fifteen minutes from entering the port. That is what this is about: fifteen minutes. She confirmed that she was in a rented vehicle that did not have diplomatic plates. Just pause for a moment and ask yourself the question: comparing the situation that was raised by our distinguished friends in relation to the Iran hostages case - a delay of fifteen minutes to enter a port facility. It was then followed by, apparently, a further delay as it says here of 45 minutes to get on board the boat. We explained yesterday that that was due to the gangway being raised and there was an issue about bringing the gangway down, and that took some time to resolve until apparently the crew realized who the individual was who wanted to get on board.

If at the end of the day this case and the facts on 7 November are about an hour's delay, this really is not something that ought to be detaining the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, with great respect to our friends and with even greater respect to this Tribunal.

We heard more about re-fuelling in the presentation this morning. This really is not a significant issue, but since the other Party keeps coming back to it, let us just be clear about what the situation is here. Justice Frimpong's order is silent on the question of re-fuelling. Overnight I asked for an account of what has actually happened in relation to the re-fuelling issue and what we understand to be the case is that at the end of the hearing in which the order was being determined Judge Frimpong was asked by counsel for Argentina how they were to go about re-fuelling the ship consistent with the terms of the order. Apparently it is not on the transcript because by this point he was walking away from his desk but Justice Frimpong replied by stating that this was such a minor matter that it was not something that he ought to be called upon to consider but rather that the parties themselves ought to

discuss and agree upon, and then file a clarification of their agreement with the registry of the court to the extent that this was necessary.

The results of our inquiries overnight have been that counsel for NML and Argentina have apparently not been able to reach an agreement on that matter. That is all there is to it. Ghana is entirely comfortable with whatever agreement the Parties come up with on that issue and has not in any way supported or is associated with a desire to prevent the re-fuelling of the vessel. That is what it is about.

Since we are on the subject of the Ghanaian courts, let me come to my sixth point, the courts of Ghana. It does seem that Argentina has a certain reluctance to engage with the internal judicial processes in Ghana to resolve this matter, and we can understand that there would be a general reluctance. What we find more difficult to understand is that they put great store in seeking a solution from the executive branch, from the Government of Ghana, whilst apparently not appreciating the extent to which that branch is distinct from and constrained by a completely independent judicial branch, but even against this background, having accepted the jurisdiction by participating in the proceedings and having obtained the order, it is very striking as to what they have and have not done. When the order came down, they did not rush to instruct their lawyers to file and appeal against the ruling of the Ghanaian court that was detaining their ship. In fact, they waited a full 12 days before filing an appeal.

I have to tell you, from my own practice as a barrister involved in several cases of this kind, when you are facing a situation of urgency, as we have been told is the case, you file immediately. In fact, you usually have the appeal ready when the order comes down, and it goes in straight away because you want the clock to start running to get the proceedings going forward as quickly as you can. That has certainly happened in the *Pinochet* case in the English courts, a case in which I was involved.

The appeal was filed in the Ghanaian courts and there it has sat, because under the law of Ghana it is in part for the appellant in that case to seek to expedite proceedings and to move things on, and Argentina cannot be said to be apparently seeking a vigorous prosecution or appeal of this matter in the courts of Ghana. The necessary administrative steps that Argentina, as appellant, needs to take in order to have the case heard quickly are all outstanding. For example, it has not yet procured the service on the parties of something I am told is called a Form 6 document, which signals the point from which time begins to run for the appeal and requires the judges to act within limited time frames. When I heard that, I was surprised. We have been hearing about all this urgency but in fact, if you look at the matter, they do not seem to be treating it with any degree of urgency in the Ghanaian court system, in which appeal is available before an independent judiciary.

You heard yesterday from the distinguished Agent of Ghana what the position of Ghana was in relation to the first instance proceedings, and you also heard that position would be maintained in future proceedings, but Ghana is merely *amicus* in the proceedings and, as an *amicus*, the executive branch has no power to move the proceedings along. You heard yesterday and you will hear again shortly that if Argentina wants to expedite the proceedings, Ghana will be completely supportive of

that, and that Ghana will maintain the position that it is taking in the domestic proceedings.

Similarly, despite the passage of time since the order having been adopted, Argentina has filed no application to abridge the time for the hearing of the appeal, and it has filed no application, for example, to have judges sit during the impending vacation from the legal term, which is about to hit us. These are all things that normally one would expect to happen but none of them have been done.

While I am on the subject of proceedings in the Ghana courts, can I just show you the file? This is the court file. (*Indicating*) I must say, I have just seen this since I arrived in Hamburg and I am not going to claim that I have read the whole thing. I have not read the whole thing. I assume our distinguished friends on the Argentine side have access to the file. They are a party to it. So this is not a matter which has been dealt with lightly, it has to be said.

However, I did take some time very late into the morning to have a look at what was in the file. We are perfectly happy to make the entire contents of the file available to this Tribunal. Frankly, we did not do so because we thought a 1,000-page document was not likely to provide great reading material in the days to come but there is quite a lot of interesting stuff in it. For example, at page 751 of the file is a letter from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires dated 23 May 2012 which is addressed, I think, as an internal letter to other parts of the Foreign Mission Service in Argentina, including, I suspect, missions abroad. This is 23 May 2012. Let us just read one paragraph, and I quote, and I do so simply on the basis that this is in the court file, so I am not speaking to the veracity, the accuracy of the translation of this document. It is simply one of the documents in the file, apparently not challenged:

The frigate *Libertad* enjoys the immunities provided for the State's public property. However, bearing in mind the existence of judicial proceedings against the Republic in various foreign jurisdictions, it is not possible to guarantee that its training voyage might not result in potential claims, precautionary measures or enforcement measures during its stay in foreign ports.

We place reliance on this simply for the following point. They knew in May 2012 that there were serious risks involved with this vessel. Ghana did not know about any of this in relation the exchange of letters but still the vessel was allowed to sail, and difficulties did in due course ensue, and people have lost their jobs as a result of those difficulties, people in Argentina.

I make only this point: this was entirely preventable. The costs that Ghana has been put to in participating in these proceedings, in devoting human resources to the management of this issue, in the loss of revenue to its port authority of US \$160,000 a day, all could have been prevented if Argentina had acted differently.

I would simply say, in assessing the balance of equities in this matter, and when you hear the critique that Ghana has been put to yesterday and again today, this is not Ghana's dispute, this is not Ghana's case, this is not something of Ghana's making. It was known, it was predictable, it was predicted, it could have been prevented, and nothing was done to stop that. That, I think, is why the history of this case, the bond,

the waiver of immunity, the court proceedings in New York and in London, are all highly relevant.

We will make this file available to the Tribunal if that would be helpful.

 By contrast, what we do see is that Argentina moved with considerable haste to bring proceedings to an Annex VII tribunal and to this Tribunal. It filed an application to establish an Annex VII tribunal – I am just going to say that I wrote these words last night, before the distinguished Agent's intervention this morning – "but everyone in this room knows that it is most unlikely that an arbitration tribunal will ever hear this matter." We then heard the offer that was made by the distinguished representative of Argentina, and I leave it to you, individual members of the Bench, to work out for yourselves the motivation behind that offer.

Argentina has had its day in court, it has had its international day in court, the media is here, in particular the Argentinean media, the matter has been widely reported in certain parts of the world, and we say that is the end of the matter. It is time for these proceedings to end in the oral phase today and in the order that will follow in due course. We say therefore you really cannot make any sort of an order for provisional measures in such circumstances as we find in this case, where there is plainly no jurisdiction, where Argentina by its own actions has not pursued the matter with urgency in all the fora that are available to it, in which there is no irreparable harm, and in which the Annex VII arbitral tribunal on the present schedule will be constituted very shortly.

 That is not to say that your order might not be very useful in certain respects. You have heard from us a great number of assurances that are given fully, openly transparently and in good faith. We have assured Argentina of our total desire to work cooperatively with them in the courts of Ghana. We have provided assurances that, working with them, we will do everything we can to expedite the appeal process, and you have a mechanism that you have used in your previous orders in which you record those assurances, which contribute both to reconciling the parties and bringing them together but also to signalling to other entities – and here I am going to tread very carefully because it would be completely inappropriate for the executive of Ghana, through me or through anyone else, to indicate what the courts of Ghana should or should not do, and that of course is not something I am doing, but a view from this Tribunal indicating that such cooperation as Argentina and Ghana can muster to expedite proceedings to resolve this matter would be a jolly good thing, and that is something you can record in your order, whilst rejecting the Request for provisional measures.

By way of conclusion, it is not just that Argentina's problems remain after we have heard them this morning; I would say to you that they are compounded, because we really did hear nothing. Argentina still has to persuade you that there are two rules in UNCLOS, one providing for the immunity of a vessel such as this in the internal waters of Ghana and the other providing a clear rule that Argentina is not entitled to waive any such immunity, assuming it to exist. We just do not see how they can possibly succeed in relation to these matters. We do not see that Argentina has put anything before the Tribunal which allows an argument to be made that the Convention precludes it, for example, from waiving immunity by prior written

agreement in respect of a vessel that is located in another State's internal waters.
 That is not a matter for this Tribunal in interpreting a contractual agreement
 governed by New York law in a bond issued in a faraway place.

Plainly, no such rule is to be found in article 18 or 32 or 87 or 90. It is, we say, as simple as that but we go one step further, just by way of closing. If ITLOS were to accede to this, astonishing as that would be, it would effectively be saying that an international court, at a provisional measures phase, could overturn the express choice-of-law provision by the parties to a contract and say that the immunity has not been waived.

That is a decision which would have very significant and global consequences. It would create huge uncertainty in the commercial marketplace not just for sovereign bond issues, of which, as you all know, there is a great number, but also for a great number of other commercial transactions in which security is a vitally important matter.

Mr President, Mr Vice-President, Members of the Tribunal, that concludes my part of the presentation this morning. We now invite you to call to the bar the distinguished Agent of Ghana to conclude Ghana's submissions.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Thank you, Mr Sands. I now give the floor to the Co-Agent of Ghana, Mr Ebenezer Appreku.

**MR APPREKU:** Mr President, distinguished Members of the Tribunal, it falls to me to conclude Ghana's oral presentation this afternoon.

With the greatest of respect, a signed copy of Ghana's submission will be handed to the Registry shortly.

Mr President, it has been a great honour for me to be a member and Co-Agent of Ghana's representation and first appearance before this Tribunal. Ghana is proud to have been able to contribute over many decades to the development of international law, and not least our contribution to the law of the sea. My country has a strong tradition in this regard: we were active participants in the Law of the Sea Conference, then led by the Attorney General of Ghana; Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, who showed enormous interest in law of the sea matters, is from Ghana; the General-Secretary of the International Seabed Authority, who has recently been elected for a second term, is also from Ghana; and, even closer to Hamburg, as you know, my country considers it a great honour that the first President of this Tribunal is from Ghana. We were the second African country, only after Mauritius, to make a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, on 28 April 2009. So, Mr President, you can see that Ghana is mindful of its rights and obligations under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, especially so since traditionally we have been the Chair of the Programme of Assistance for the Sustained Teaching and Wider Appreciation of International Law under the UN.

Mr President, Ghana has been strongly supportive of the 1982 Convention since its inception, and equally supportive of this Tribunal. That does not mean, however, that Ghana should simply accept jurisdiction in Part XV proceedings without any regard to

what the drafters of the 1982 Convention contemplated. That is why we have expressed regret that the Annex VII proceedings were initiated against us in the first place, in circumstances that were not appropriate in our view. For the reasons explained by Professor Sands yesterday afternoon, this Tribunal has not been called upon to adjudge a dispute falling under the 1982 Convention. This is not an "international law of the sea" dispute. It is not an inter-State dispute in the traditional, strict sense. We are not in dispute with Argentina, a friendly country, with regard to any of the provisions of the 1982 Convention. There is no rule or provision of the 1982 Convention to interpret and apply, within the meaning of article 288.

Mr President, the obvious jurisdictional flaw at the heart of Argentina's case cannot be overstated. Professor Sands took the Tribunal to all four provisions of UNCLOS cited in Argentina's Request for provisional measures. None of these four provisions contains any right that Argentina can invoke in this case. We listened attentively to the arguments put to us yesterday morning and today by Argentina. With the greatest respect, nothing that we have heard causes Ghana to change her position.

However, even putting the jurisdictional hurdle to one side and for argument's sake ignoring article 288, paragraph 1, the requirements for provisional measure are plainly not met. Put simply, Mr President, this case also fails on the facts. That is why we have taken the time to take the Members of this distinguished Tribunal through the facts of the case, the various proceedings in national courts, the terms of the waiver of immunity contained in the bond issued by Argentina, the proceedings brought in Ghana, and all the steps taken by the executive branch of my government to ensure the welfare of the *Libertad*'s crew.

 Mr President, Members of the Tribunal, for me it was disconcerting and discomforting, because we are dealing in a friendly atmosphere, to hear Argentina's account of the facts yesterday. In her opening speech, the distinguished Agent for the Argentine Republic went as far as to state that the crew of the *Libertad* "is living practically in a state of arrest". Needless to say, the welfare of the *Libertad*'s crew is taken very seriously by the Ghanaian authorities. Anticipating that the welfare of the crew would also weigh on the Members of this Tribunal, Ghana sought a clarification of the situation from the ports authority; this is to be found at Tab 1 of the Judge's Folder. It is clear from this evidence that the ports authority has taken all possible measures to ensure the welfare of the vessel's crew. The crew members are not under arrest; they are free to leave and return to the vessel as they deem fit. No crew member has been prevented from disembarkation nor has any crew member been detained in any way, shape or form. We invite this honourable Tribunal to assess the real facts with as much care as we know it will when it looks as the law.

There is another point that I feel bound to mention. We have listened most attentively to the presentations made on behalf of Argentina. They are entitled to the fullest respect, and they have our fullest respect. However, I am bound to say that I was surprised that the esteemed Agent of Argentina made as much as she did of the statement that I made to the High Court in Accra, setting forth the views of the Government of Ghana on certain matters before the High Court. It seemed as though the distinguished Agent was portraying my submissions before the High Court as somehow inconsistent with Ghana's submissions before this Tribunal. You will have recognized immediately that there is no inconsistency. In the proceedings between

NML and Argentina, the executive arm of the Ghanaian Government, represented by the Attorney General's Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intervened as a friend of the court – in the capacity of *amicus*. The government adopted a position before the High Court that was supportive of Argentina. We realized that the Argentine Republic had found itself in a difficult position and therefore intervened to assist.

I appeared before the High Court not, I underscore with the greatest respect, in my personal capacity but in my official capacity as a legal adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the views that I expressed reflected what I was authorized to say by the Foreign Minister. In expressing its views, the Government of Ghana acted within the confines of Ghana's domestic laws and in accordance with its Constitution. Despite our best efforts, the High Court's decision did not go Argentina's way, and the views expressed by the executive arm of government of Ghana, which it continues to hold, were not accepted. That case is on appeal, and it is a matter of surprise to us that Argentina has not sought to expedite those proceedings. Given all that you heard yesterday about urgency, one would have thought that Argentina would do all it could to move the appeal along as fast as possible. The Government of Ghana would support such an endeavour, but as it is a mere *amicus* it is not in a position to move matters along at any greater speed than the appellant – Argentina.

Mr President, we hope that Argentina moves those proceedings along with greater speed, and we will do all we can to support them in that endeavour. Indeed, you heard us say yesterday that we are willing to work with Argentina to achieve the earliest possible resolution of this matter. My government does not stand to gain anything from this unhappy state of affairs – in fact, quite the opposite. However, such efforts must be conducted in accordance with our laws and consistent with our strong commitment to the rule of law at both national and international levels.

 In coming before this Tribunal, we have had to pay the closest attention to the limits of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. It is plain to us that there is no dispute under the Convention. It is plain to us that the Annex VII tribunal will not have jurisdiction to resolve a dispute in respect of articles 18, 32, 87 and 90 of the Convention, because those provisions are simply not engaged. The fact that Argentina invokes them cannot be sufficient to found jurisdiction. This honourable Tribunal has to take those provisions and the facts and decide whether, *prima facie*, the jurisdiction of the Annex VII tribunal on the merits may be established. We do not see how this honourable Tribunal could possibly conclude that it may. None of the articles of the Convention invoked by Argentina is relevant to the exercise by Ghana of its sovereign rights over activities conducted in its internal waters.

That does not mean we will not move speedily to constitute the tribunal: in accordance with article 3(c) of Annex VII of the Convention we have appointed an arbitrator, and we are ready to move speedily to the appointment of the three remaining arbitrators. But I must be very clear on our position: we will be bound to oppose the jurisdiction of the Annex VII tribunal; and since that tribunal will have no jurisdiction, it is evident that this Tribunal cannot accede to Argentina's Request for provisional matters to order the provisional measures it has requested – or any provisional measures at all – to cover the short period between now and the

constitution of the Annex VII tribunal. This will not be the first case in which the Tribunal has declined to order provisional measures.

That does mean that an order of this Tribunal declining to order provisional measures might not provide some measure of assistance to the parties. It could, for example, record our commitment to the utility of continued cooperation between the parties in achieving a speedy resolution of the matter, and our commitment to be as supportive as we can in expediting the proceedings before the courts of Ghana if that is an approach to which Argentina is attached. Our commitment to work with Argentina is strong and unwavering.

I must say that I was therefore a bit surprised when we heard the proposal that came from the distinguished Agent of Argentina that they do not want to hear anything about the Court of Appeal case, but I want to assure my distinguished counterpart that when the matter comes before the Court of Appeal, if they are minded to activate the process that is available to them, probably I personally will lead the judge to assist, but the ball is in their court.

Mr President, an hour ago we heard the proposal, as I have hinted, by the Argentine Agent, my distinguished counterpart, Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, on behalf of her government that Argentina has now decided to withdraw from the Annex VII arbitration and instead to have the matter submitted to a panel before this distinguished Tribunal – provided that Ghana accepts this proposal. We have noted the proposal and it will be considered in due course, after the Tribunal has given its order.

Mr President, by way of conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my sincere gratitude to the Registrar, his staff and also express my thanks to the translators for the exemplary way they have carried out their work. We thank our distinguished colleagues from Argentina for contributing to the positive atmosphere in cooperating with us in these proceedings. We thank you, Mr President and Members of the Tribunal, for according us your attention and your commitment to promoting the rule of law with respect for the 1982 Convention.

Finally, pursuant to article 75 of the Rules of the Tribunal, it remains for me to read out Ghana's submissions.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Appreku. I understand that this was the last statement made by Ghana during this hearing. As you said, article 75, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the Tribunal provides that at the conclusion of the last statement made by a Party at the hearing its Agent, without recapitulation of the arguments, shall read the Party's final submissions. The written text of these submissions signed by the Agent shall be communicated to the Tribunal and a copy of it shall be transmitted to the other Party.

I now invite the Co-Agent of Ghana, Mr Appreku to take the floor to present the final submissions of the Respondent. You have the floor.

**MR APPREKU:** Mr President, distinguished Members of the Tribunal, for the reasons set out in our Written Statement and on the basis of the facts and the legal argument

put before you today and yesterday afternoon, the Republic of Ghana requests the
 Tribunal: to reject the request for provisional measures filed by Argentina on
 14 November 2012; and to order Argentina to pay all costs incurred by the Republic
 of Ghana in connection with this request.

Thank you Mr President.

 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Appreku. This brings us to the end of the hearing. On behalf of the Tribunal, I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the high quality of the presentations of the representatives of both the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Ghana. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank both the Agent of Argentina and the Co-Agent of Ghana for their exemplary spirit of cooperation.

The Registrar will now address questions in relation to documentation.

**THE REGISTRAR** (*Interpretation from French*): Mr President, pursuant to article 86, paragraph 4, of the Rules of the Tribunal, the Parties may, under the supervision of the Tribunal, correct the transcripts of speeches and statements made on their behalf, but in no case may such corrections affect the meaning and scope thereof. These corrections relate to the verified versions of the transcripts in the official language used by the Party in question. The corrections should be submitted to the Registry as soon as possible and by Friday, 7 December 2012 at 5.00 p.m. Hamburg time, at the latest

Thank you.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The order in this case is tentatively set to 15 December 2012. The Agents of the Parties will be informed reasonably in advance of any change to this date.

In accordance with the usual practice, I request the Agents to kindly remain at the disposal of the Tribunal in order to provide any further assistance and information that it may need in its deliberations prior to the delivery of the judgment.

The hearing is now closed.

(The sitting closed at 1.10 p.m.)

30/11/2012 p.m.